

IDEOLOGY, STATE SECURITY, AND STATE
TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

Daniel G. Acheson-Brown

B.A. Washburn University, 1981

B.S. Kansas State University, 1986

A MASTER'S THESIS

submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1989

Approved by

Michael W. Suleiman

Major Professor

LD
2468
.T4
P65C
1989
A34
C. 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A11208 314975

CHAPTER		Page
I.	Introduction.	1
	Literature Review	3
	Statement of the Problem and Research Design.	24
	Definition of Terms	28
II.	Israel and the Occupied Territories	31
	Ideology.	31
	Security Policies in the Occupied Territories.	57
	Types of State Terror in the Occupied Territories.	71
	Summary of Case Study Findings.	94
III.	South Africa	96
	Ideology.	96
	State Security Policies	105
	Types of State Terror in South Africa	117
	Summary of Case Study Findings.	127
IV.	Conclusion.	129
	Bibliography.	135

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I welcome the opportunity to express my thanks and gratitude to those individuals who have contributed to my graduate studies at Kansas State.

Professor Michael W. Suleiman has been an excellent teacher and mentor. I could ask for no better. Professor Suleiman's contribution to my academic development is great and much appreciated.

My appreciation also goes to Professors William Richter and Alden Williams for their interest and excellent teaching. I have learned much about political science scholarship from them.

My parents have contributed to my scholarship interests by instilling in me a deep concern for people and justice. Their encouragement has been vitally important.

I have also learned from my friends. Several of my friends have personally experienced the trauma of state repression and terrorism. I thank them for sharing with me the painful realities they have bravely faced. Other friends are conscious and supportive of human rights for all people throughout the world. I am proud to struggle for democracy along with them. Barb Warren deserves special appreciation for typing this thesis. Her patience and computer expertise were invaluable. Paige Nichols helped out at several critical points--her ability to accomplish tasks despite barriers is much appreciated.

CHAPTER I

Introduction

On December 10, 1988, the United Nations celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Unfortunately there was little in the way of empirical evidence to cause celebration. State terrorism, according to Herman's estimate, claimed the lives of several million people between 1962 and 1982.¹ This does not include people who were terrorized by governments in some manner just short of death. Amnesty International reported that more countries were charged with human rights abuses last year than at any time in the organization's 27 year history. Ninety of the one hundred and thirty-five human rights abusing countries are guilty of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners.

Despite its widespread practice and severity, state repression/terrorism has suffered from a lack of social science attention. John McCamant comments,

Although human rights advocates have awakened those who would listen to the human tragedy of violations of civil and political liberties, social scientists have, by and large, continued to ignore political repression.²

Alex Schmid also points out the imbalance in scholarship, Terrorism by regimes has a longer history than

¹ Edward Herman, The Real Terror Network (Boston: South End Press, 1982).

² John McCamant, "Governance Without Blood: Social Science's Antiseptic View of Rule; or, The Neglect of Political Repression," The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), p. 11.

insurgent terrorism and from this one could expect that theory formation is more advanced and that the number of available theories is greater. But that is not so. Except for the writings on totalitarianism there is not much to fall back on.³

Why has state repression and terrorism been largely ignored by social scientists? Ted Gurr provides an explanation,

Most definitions of the state in social scientific analysis incorporate the Weberian notion that the state is characterized by legitimacy and a monopoly of the means of coercion. From this perspective, "state terrorism" is merely a pejorative label for what states do by right.⁴

Such a perspective, so biased in favor of the state, helps explain why state terrorism is ignored. Not all scholars share this perspective--Richard Falk, George Lopez, Michael Stohl, John McCamant, Jorge Domínguez, and Alex Schmid all advocate more scholarly analysis of the state as terrorist. Some social scientists who live under repressive regimes do not ignore state terrorism. Researchers in Chile have established underground social science centers committed to the analysis of governmental violence. In an effort to circumvent the heavy censorship in South Africa, an

³ Alex Schmid, Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983), p. 171.

⁴ Ted Robert Gurr, "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis," Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 45.

internationally distributed underground news analysis entitled "South Scan" has been established.

When a particular type of regime behavior takes the lives of so many people and injures many more, it clearly should not be ignored.

It is instructive to note that, in contrast to the paucity of scholarship on state terrorism, there has in recent years been a proliferation of writings on non-state terrorism. This state of affairs is extremely unbalanced, for the fact remains that the overwhelming percentage of human rights violations are perpetrated by states against their own citizens or populations under their control. Why do states use severe violence against people? Scholars have suggested that states use terrorism as a means of enforcing ideological positions.

Literature Review

This review of the literature is focused on state terrorism and associated variables. Generally the literature on state terror and repression falls into two categories. One consists of philosophical and theoretical literature. This literature proposes to explain state terrorism, yet for the most part lacks social scientific analysis. The other consists of raw data on human rights violations documented by human rights monitoring agencies. Both types of information are required for this study.

The data from human rights agencies consist of reports detailing severe human rights violations by governments. A wide range of non-governmental organizations collect and document information of this kind. Sources such as Amnesty International are valuable to any study of human rights violations. They are not, in and of themselves, works of social science analysis.

Prior to examining the literature, the paucity of writings on the topic of state terrorism is addressed. The reason for neglect of this topic is twofold. First, there is the Weberian bias in favor of the legitimacy of the state.⁵ This bias, according to McCamant, is related to a general flaw in models in mainstream academia that make political repression irrelevant. The emphasis has been on the social forces which make a system function smoothly. The political repression present in a system was not seen to be important because it was used against elements not contributing but rather detracting from the driving mechanisms of society. The "ideal" system is analogous to an organic body where all cells make a contribution unless they are deviant, therefore cancerous, and consequently deserving of excision.⁶ Arendt shows that people defined as threats and "superfluous" to a

⁵ Gurr, op. cit., p. 45-46.

⁶ McCamant, op. cit., p. 23-25.

system can be eliminated with relative ease.⁷ The emphasis on system maintenance is not necessarily a recent bias.

State terrorism is not a recent phenomenon. Governments have employed terror as a means of control from ancient times to the present. Public hangings, torture, inquisitions, crucifixions, floggings and a wide range of other punishments have been common methods of enforcing the policies of empire and state.

Machiavelli's (1469-1527), The Prince, is one of the older works advocating the use of skillful cruelty as a means of instilling fear in a populace. Machiavelli had no compunction in recommending the use of severe force as a means of governance. His prescriptions were calculated to maintain the prince's rule. Over time government through violence has become a sophisticated endeavor. Arendt wrote, in the aftermath of World War II, on the origins of totalitarian government. From her study she theorized that the "essence" of totalitarian government is terror and the basis for such behavior is ideological. Totalitarian ideologies identify their enemies even before acquiring power - they are exact in defining the enemy. Terror is used by the totalitarian regime first as a tactic to consolidate power by eliminating opposition, and later as an ideologically based attack on those defined as "objective threats" to the state. "Objective

⁷ Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966) p. 437.

threats" to the state are ideologically derived, they are judged as inherently threatening, and they are not necessarily threats by their acts or behaviors. It is important to stress that such "objective enemies of the state" may have done nothing in opposition to the state. Arendt's philosophical study explicitly contends that Weltanschauung (worldview) plays a critical role in the facilitation of state terror. Totalitarian ideologies, according to Arendt, assume that one idea (reductionism) explains everything. An abstract perception or worldview cannot be superseded by facts or experience. Facts and experiences are to be molded and shaped to fit ideological frameworks. But totalitarian ideologies in and of themselves have no capability to transform reality, terror is the "device" used for transformation. Arendt's contribution is to focus attention on the importance of the ideological variable in the analysis of state terrorism.⁸ Like Arendt, Kren and Rappoport found that the SS perpetrated terror and genocide based on ideological beliefs. The SS were committed to the metaphysical ideals of National Socialism.⁹

McCamant has criticized writings on totalitarianism as limited in such a way that, totalitarianism is made into an "aberration, and by implication, it presumes that governmental

⁸ Ibid., p. 460-479.

⁹ George Kren and Leon Rappoport, The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980).

terror does not exist in other polities."¹⁰ McCamant's concern is that terror not be seen as specific only to so-called totalitarian governments. State-terrorism is committed by governments of various typologies, many not considered to be totalitarian. McCamant's point, as well as that of those who analyze state terror in the "third world," is particularly relevant to this study because the model applied here is not restricted to totalitarian regimes. Schmid claims that Arendt overstates the role of terror.¹¹ Terror is only one aspect of totalitarian rule. An exaggerated emphasis on terror overlooks the system support factors such as mobilization of the population, legitimization through massive popular support, the party and ideology. Schmid and McCamant place emphasis on the recognition of nontotalitarian state terrorism.

Totalitarianism is a confusing term in the sense that there is no exact and clear distinction between authoritarian and totalitarian government. Some scholars regard the supposed differences as irrelevant because one can usually find totalitarianism in governments labelled as strictly authoritarian by others. However, Schmidt, like Arendt, sees the importance of ideology to any analysis of state terror. Although Schmid does not elaborate at length on analytical

¹⁰ McCamant, op. cit., p. 11.

¹¹ Schmid, op. cit., p. 171.

models, he emphasizes the structural-functional aspects of a system and implicitly suggests the efficacy of a systems analysis model which recognizes the ideological variable. Schmid conducted a study of scholars who deal with terrorism. When asked which current theories explaining the rise of state terrorism are worthwhile for empirical testing, more than half of the researchers either left the question unanswered, answered "none" or did not know. Of those responding, the theories of Arendt, Walter, and Aron were each mentioned twice as worthwhile for empirical testing.¹²

Walter studied several tribal African communities and looked at rulers secure in their authority who, nevertheless, chose to rule through violence and fear. His subject regimes were not totalitarian. Walter found an "ideology that justifies the violence" as one of the most important conditions for terrorism. Additionally Walter determined that the victims must be expendable or superfluous to the system.¹³

Aron discusses terror as the dialectical outcome of subversion and repression - a state of fear is the result. Aron's bias is essentially conservative, for he accuses revolutionaries, not states, of initiating and taking political terror to the furthest degree.¹⁴ Nevertheless,

¹² Ibid., p. 171.

¹³ Ibid., p. 171-172.

¹⁴ Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1966) p. 169-170.

Aron, like Arendt and Walter, shares the notion that ideology plays a key role in the use of terror. Aron finds German and Japanese actions in World War II based on what he calls a geographical ideology which harbored the guiding principles for the acquisition of more land and space through military conquest.¹⁵

A great deal of the philosophical literature on state repression pertains to the Nazi, Stalinist, Fascist, or various Communist regimes. In addition to ignoring nontotalitarian government violence, authors specializing in totalitarian government have been criticized as "poisoned" by their ideological bias.¹⁶ Inevitably writers have slanted their discussions of state terror to indict either left wing or right wing regimes. In particular, writers show a strong inclination to link state terror with a specific economic system. Some authors have excused so-called authoritarian governments on the grounds that they are more able to change than totalitarian governments. However, Falk's research indicates severe repression cuts across the boundaries of economic systems. Falk does not contend that economic variables play no role, but rather that state repression and terror can and do exist under a variety of different economic systems. Thus, politics, not economics, plays the critical

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 197-209.

¹⁶ Schmid, op.cit., p. 174.

role in explaining state terror. It is not necessarily the national economic system of a state that determines state terrorism. Falk holds the state-centered international system at fault. The near automatic legitimacy of the state in an international environment where geopolitical considerations reign supreme makes issues of human rights nearly irrelevant. Falk draws attention directly to the problem of the state and its use of violence.¹⁷

The broadened perspective of Falk, Schmid, and McCamant includes all repressive governments, not just those defined as totalitarian. Writing in the late 1970's, Falk predicted the growing prevalence of "hard states," i.e., states capable of executing extreme forms of repression while simultaneously resisting, insulating, and ignoring pressures from the outside. The "hard state" hypothesis applies to states governed by extreme "statism" which are generally unconcerned about violating human rights. Falk lists eight categories of human right violations: genocide; official racism; large scale official terrorism; totalitarian governance; deliberate refusal to satisfy basic human needs; ecocide; and war crimes. Large-scale official terrorism is, according to Falk, "when a government systematically engages in terror to maintain its political control or intimidate its opposition."¹⁸ Falk does

¹⁷ Richard Falk, Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meir Publishers, 1981) p. 63-124.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 178-179.

not specify the difference between "large-scale" and "small-scale" terrorism.

The use of "small" scale terrorism in a sophisticated manner is precisely what Arancibia found the Chilean regime employing as a means of improving the junta's image abroad after large scale state terrorism had eliminated most of the opposition.¹⁹ Falk's typology of "hard states" is an important contribution to the study of state terror, but rigorous criteria for determining precisely what defines a "hard state" are not specified by Falk. It can be surmised from Falk's writings that hard states are spartan, closed to political innovation, authoritarian, and possessing large military and security establishments. These factors give the researcher a general direction. Even states which might be considered "hard states," Chile, for example, eventually attempt to refine state terror in such a way as to minimize the impact of negative publicity. Arancibia, Charlin and Landstreet analyze Chile's utilization of information from dissident social science sources, and determine repression to be related to ideological motivations:

One must recall that the original point of the coup d'etat was to remove the left from power, bring it under permanent control and thus safeguard an endangered capitalist economic system. State terrorism and state repression in general have been rational policies designed and implemented by the

¹⁹ Jinny Arancibia, Marcel Charlin, and Peter Landstreet, "Chile," International Handbook of Human Rights, edited by Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1987) p. 49-73.

military government in pursuit of these objectives.²⁰

Without the extreme commitment to certain ideological principles the motivation to implement policies of terrorism would be absent. State terrorism fits into the Weltanschauung of the Chilean junta. Thus, state terror was the praxis necessary to uphold a particular ideological prescription.

Arancibia, et al. analyzed the state of siege and emergency proclamations in Chile and determined that these decrees amounted to a state of war providing the "legal" basis under military rule for detained persons to "disappear." Arrests were actually called "capture of the enemy" and those individuals killed (30,000) were "war casualties."²¹

Arancibia, et al. discuss repression in Chile as having five stages:

1. Eruption of Repression, 1973-74.
2. Institutionalization of Repression, 1974-77.
3. Repressive Stabilization, 1977-81.
4. Constitutional Repression, 1981-83.
5. Repression and Major Civil Resistance, 1983-present.

Two general periods of repression were discerned. From 1973 to 1977, there was "unchecked state terrorism." From 1977 to the present, the repression has been more selective under a "legal" constitutional facade. The stages of repression in Chile elaborated by Arancibia, help to sharpen the analysis of state terror.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 68.

²¹ Ibid., p. 54-55.

Lewellen addresses state terror in El Salvador from a systems analysis perspective. The El Salvadorean polity is viewed as an "organic" system wherein the boundaries of the system define the limits to change. Lewellen's analysis finds that state repression is the "logical result of the organization of the system itself, a system designed to create poverty and inequality. Repression is the only means by which the system boundaries can be maintained."²² The elite or ruling class in El Salvador define the system boundaries and are anxious to maintain these boundaries. The ruling oligarchy or a particular group within the oligarchy is often supported by external forces - the United States in the case of El Salvador. Lewellen discusses the political system and its boundaries. The oligarchy defines the boundaries and uses repression as a means of maintaining system boundaries. Boundaries, thus, are limits imposed on those who live under the particular political system. In El Salvador, the oligarchy defines the boundaries in such a way that real political participation exists only for a few elite families. This causes dissent and opposition. The state responds to dissent and opposition through the use of repression and state terrorism. First the government imposes severe repression, then escalates the use of violence to state terrorism. In El

²² Ted C. Lewellen, "Structures of Terror: A Systems Analysis of Repression in El Salvador," Human Rights and Third World Development, edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr., and Ved P. Nanda (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) p. 59-81.

Salvador, like Chile, "all opposition" is to be "exterminated, including moderates."²³ The ruling elite articulates an ideology which serves their interests and defines the system boundaries while practical politics calls for certain policies designed to maintain the system. Lewellen's model views the repressive state as the original cause of oppositional violence and analyzes the violent system maintenance actions of the decision-makers. The systems approach view is not intended by Lewellen to break from other perspectives; rather it is complementary. Lewellen does not deny other explanations, but holds many explanations as compatible with his systems theory approach. He articulates an analysis which shows state terrorism as systemic to the overall El Salvadorean socio-political system. In this respect, Lewellen's analysis is similar to the authors (Lewin, Alcock, Galtung) who stress the structural violence of poverty and inequality. Lewellen contends state terrorism is predictable.

Bowen, in his analysis of Guatemala, examines the structural violence of poverty and inequality.²⁴ Then he traces the establishment of a counterrevolutionary state, followed by counterinsurgency as the "midwife to state terrorism." Bowen finds the problem in Guatemala to be the

²³ Ibid., p. 59.

²⁴ Gordon L. Bowen, "The Political Economy of State Terrorism: Barrier to Human Rights in Guatemala," Human Rights and Third World Development, edited by George W. Shepherd, Jr., and Ved P. Nanda (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985) p. 83-124.

structure of the state and its use of state terrorism as a functional form of rule. External support from the U.S. helped facilitate the establishment of a state of terror in Guatemala.

The search for a general theory of state terrorism led Duvall and Stohl to develop a universally applicable theory of state terrorism. The level of their theory is very general. Those who make decisions to implement policies of state terrorism believe terrorism is "relatively more effective" than alternative means of governance. Terrorism is efficacious relative to other options in "eliminating or quieting some actual or perceived challenge or threat." Duvall and Stohl claim that terrorism may not be seen as highly efficacious, but only more efficacious when compared to other means deemed ineffective. Duvall and Stohl found that state terrorism may be initiated by strong states or weak states. The weak state engages in terrorism because it is a relatively effective means of regime maintenance. Strong states which are "militaristic states" and/or which function in an "ideological-mission syndrome" engage in state terrorism when domestic retribution is low and/or when they are not significantly affected by international pressure.²⁵ Governments having had successful past experiences with state

²⁵ Schmid, op. cit., p. 177-178.

terrorism are expected to use terror more intensely and more often.

Gurr proposes the analysis of state terrorism within the framework of conflict theory. Conflict theory posits that state terrorism comes about through interaction between elites and oppositions.²⁶ In Gurr's view, it is not sufficient to explain state terrorism by examining the characteristics of the state and ruling elite. Gurr differentiates between situational and institutionalized state terrorism. Regimes that use state terror over a long time period have institutionalized terrorism. Examples include the Soviet KGB, NKVD, OGPU; SAVAK (Iran), and DINA (Chile), and the "secret" death squads in Guatemala, El Salvador and Argentina. Situational state terror is carried out in short, harsh, reactive bursts, after which it is dropped. Gurr advocates a model which examines the challengers, the state and political ideology, social heterogeneity and inequality, and "the global environment."²⁷

Gurr starts his analysis by looking at the group, class or party whom the elite regard as a threat to their rule. The "challengers" pose a conflict with the regime which would not, according to Gurr, resort to state terror without

²⁶ Gurr, op. cit., p. 45.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 51-71.

provocation by the challengers.²⁸ This view is not shared by other authors. Arendt and Walter show cases where the state initiates terrorism against groups simply defined as enemies. Marx also starts the analysis at a different point, contending that conditions of oppression and repression exist before consciousness drives people to challenge the state. However, Gurr does recognize the importance of studying the character of the state, its ideological outlook and prevailing political traditions as a means of understanding the phenomenon of state terrorism. The analysis done by Gurr posits that democratic values are the barrier to state terror. In addition, Gurr finds that social heterogeneity and inequality are positively associated with state terror.²⁹ Minority elites in highly stratified societies are likely to use state terror - South Africa serves as Gurr's example. The global environment impacts on a given state's use of state terrorism - states participating in international geopolitical competition are more likely to use state terrorism. Gurr stresses the supremacy of situational, not structural factors. Gurr focuses on the situational aspects of elite/non-elite interactions. The only structural condition associated with state terrorism is the case of minority rule in a highly

²⁸ Ibid., p. 51.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 58.

stratified society. Additionally, Gurr stresses the past use of terror as a determinant of state terrorism.

Gurr's analysis does not contend that state terrorism is systemically explainable, rather it is situationally explainable. The challengers create the situation by provoking the state. The challenger's behavior is explained through the theory of relative deprivation. State terrorism is not an inevitable outcome of particular socio-political systems. In contrast, Lewellen's conceptualization of the organic system makes the state behavior more predictable.

The literature on state terrorism, although limited, directs the researcher towards the question of ideology and state terrorism. Different explanations exist for state terrorism: totalitarianism; systems theory; conflict theory; authoritarianism; "hard state" theory; and class struggle theory. The role of ideology is a variable of most explanations. Some explanations rely more on ideology than others (Arendt, Walter, Aron, Arancibia, Kren). The emphasis on ideology does not necessarily associate a particular political economy with state terrorism, but instead proposes that a certain type of Weltanschauung in governmental elites is associated with state terrorism. If this "worldview" were not such as it is, the use of state terror as a means of governance would not occur. This view asserts that a given elite has a certain conceptualization of nation-state and/or regime security (often the two are synonymous to those in

power) which is associated with the use of state terrorism. The ideology in question here has been called national security ideology (George Lopez). Admiral Guzzetti, Foreign Minister in the Argentine junta during the "dirty war," expressed national security in biological-organic terms:

My idea of subversion is that of the left-wing terrorist organizations. Subversion or terrorism of the right is not the same thing. When the social body of the country has been contaminated by a disease that eats away its entrails, it forms antibodies. These antibodies cannot be considered in the same way as microbes.³⁰

Guzzetti speaks in terms of the very survival of the state as a desperate Mannichean battle.

Lopez's examination of national security ideology posits a relationship with systematic governmental violence and state terror. Lopez asserts:

I argue that the justification for and maintenance of this patterned and persistent violence by government against real and presumed adversaries rests in the discrete, identifiable and self-reinforcing dimensions of a shared mindset of governing elites.³¹

Although Lopez examines the national security "mindset" of Latin American elites, he maintains similar processes occur elsewhere. Lopez finds that elites using state violence feel that they embody the state and therefore are on a mission to protect defined values. General Pinochet defines the state as an "organic component," produced by "people settled on a

³⁰ The Nation, 31.October 1987, p. 477.

³¹ Lopez, op. cit., p. 75.

portion of territory both of which are united under the idea of the state."³²

In the name of state security, national security ideology authorizes and justifies state terrorism. It is the ideology which lifts all restraints against severe and routine violation of human rights. National security ideology "is the guarantee given by the state to achieve or defend national goals against hostilities and pressures."³³ Operationalizing national security ideology requires the implementation of internal war on challengers to regime power and program. The "enemy" is defined as a human representation of "ideas and social forces," regardless of whether or not the ideas culminate in oppositional action.³⁴ National security ideology thus pertains to internal state security. It does not pertain to the internationally recognized right to defend against external attack or invasion--such a concept is considered a matter of national security, but not national security ideology.

Lopez contributes to research on state terrorism by articulating an ideological explanation. This ideological explanation consists of a particular conceptualization of state security held by ruling elites. Research into state

³² Ibid., p. 81.

³³ Ibid., p. 76.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 83-84.

terrorism should test for the presence of ideological prescriptions pertaining to state security.

The more specific literature comparing the South African and Israeli regimes is important to this study. Authors writing on Israel and South Africa point to the importance of ideology, but they do not show in depth how an exclusivist ideology can facilitate active policies which constitute state terrorism. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the available comparative literature on South Africa and Israel.

Adam (Frankfurt School)³⁵ sees both South Africa and Israel as ethnic states possessing the qualities of a "sovereign protectorate" wherein the state is defined in terms of the myths and symbols of the ruling group. The state is the exclusive domain of a particular ruling group committed to an ideology which is the possession of only that group. Ethnic states translate the ruling group's ideology into laws and customs "at the expense of secular citizenship rights." These types of states govern over populations determined to be "untrustworthy at birth." Prime examples of ethnic states are Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel. Adam points out that these states, because of their economic or strategic positions, remain in the orbit of the Western world. Both South Africa and Israel are established regional powers. Both

³⁵ Heribert Adam, "Ethnic Politics and Crisis Management: Comparing South Africa and Israel," South Africa: The Limits to Reform Politics (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1983) pp. 4-21.

serve Western strategic interests, but their ideologies are not shared in common with the West. The ruling elites in Pretoria and Tel Aviv have "parochial" ideological principles which take precedence over international considerations. Both ethnic states wage repression to eliminate genuinely representative voices of the opposition. This has tended to leave no credible spokesmen to negotiate with and indicates a lack of interest in realistic negotiations. Both the Likud and Labor Parties reject outright any possibility of a Palestinian state. The National Party denies African nationalism and completely rejects the one person one vote concept. Adam contends that under such circumstances there is little hope for a consociational solution because there is no agreement on a common civic culture.

Adam rejects Marxian class struggle and liberal pluralist explanations of the role of the state in each country. Instead he sees the state in a condition of crisis management fighting to maintain its political and ideological system. The state is responsible for the violence and crisis due to its implementation of ethnocentric ideology.

In another study, Joseph³⁶ emphasizes the similarities between Zionism and Apartheid in their denial of one person one vote within the framework of a pluralistic state. Joseph characterizes Zionism and Apartheid as "anti pluralist and

³⁶ Benjamin Joseph, Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

exclusivist." There can be no progress towards democracy with these ideologies guiding the policies of Israel and South Africa. Joseph stresses the "volkisch" or "tribal" nature of Zionism and Apartheid.

Louise Cainkar³⁷ analyzes South Africa and Israel and highlights the way in which each society is structured according to ideological principles. Like Adam and Joseph, the emphasis is on ideological similarities and how there is a distinct in-group and out-group in each society.

Alfred Moleah³⁸ contends that the ideological similarities between Israel and South Africa make their relationship different from the usual pragmatic relations between other nations and South Africa. Because the two countries have similar ways of viewing the world they share a special relationship.

The relationship between South Africa and Israel prompted Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi³⁹ to investigate Israeli foreign policy and in particular its support of right-wing dictatorships. Beit-Hallahmi discovered a long history of reactionary foreign

³⁷ Louise Cainkar, Separate and Unequal: The Dynamics of South African and Israeli Rule (Chicago: Palestine Human Rights Campaign, 1985).

³⁸ Alfred Moleah, "Zionism and Apartheid: An Unlikely alliance?" Judaism or Zionism: What Difference for the Middle East? edited by The International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. (London: Zed Books, 1986).

³⁹ Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).

policy. South African-Israeli cooperation ranges from the exchange of counterinsurgency advisors and nuclear weapons research to diamond exporting.

Statement of the Problem and Research Design

The role played by ideology in the specification of what constitutes state security is the critical question addressed in this study. Lopez comments on the connection between ideology and state terror:

Ideology stimulates, rationalizes, and blesses as patriotic political behavior government actions that deny others their basic human dignity and their universal political rights. It reifies the state, making it the highest institutional value to which the ruling elite must maintain their highest commitment. Although other factors...are important components of the puzzle of state terror, they would not fit so neatly together or be mobilized so dynamically were it not for the perspective and prescription provided by ideology.⁴⁰

Ideology is seen as having a facilitative association to the use of state terrorism. When scholars analyze non-state terrorism they frequently focus on the ideological motivations of the actors. Ideological analysis is no less important for the study of why states use terrorism. It is proposed in this study that ideological objectives facilitate the use of state terrorism. Ideological prescriptions regarding state security reveal what policies are necessary when state security is

⁴⁰ George Lopez, "A Scheme for the Analysis of Government as Terrorist," The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 65-66.

threatened by people who reject the state's ideology and all its inherent assumptions.

The general hypothesis reads as follows:

Ideologies which specify one particular group as having the exclusive and, therefore, asymmetrical right to the governance of a state, facilitate the use of state terrorism against people defined as an out-group.

Testing this hypothesis would entail looking at all countries with exclusivist ideologies to check for the use of state terrorism. The study would also have to look at all countries without exclusivist ideologies to see whether any used state terrorism. As this cannot be done within the limitations of a Master's Thesis, two countries have been chosen for case study analysis. Israel and South Africa will each be informally tested for an exclusivist ideology and the use of state terrorism. A two state analysis will not confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis but it will have value as an informal test.

Before operationalizing the terms of this hypothesis as it applies to Israel and South Africa, it is necessary to define (1) exclusivist ideology and (2) state terrorism.

An exclusivist ideology is an ideology which is held by and for one particular group; other groups of people are excluded and their rights are limited according to ideological principles. An exclusivist ideology defines an in-group and an out-group (Theodor Adorno's terms). The term exclusivist as applied to ideology is used by Benjamin Joseph in Besieged

Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

State terrorism is the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act itself; a system of government that uses terror to rule.

An exclusivist ideology is operationalized as follows. If the ideologies stand for the following, then they can be classified as exclusivist:

1. the state is devoted to the security of the in-group;
2. the state acquires land and resources for the exclusive use of the in-group;
3. the state governs over people who are not granted full and equal citizenship rights (the out-group).

Specific acts which this researcher classifies as state terror include the following:

1. Beatings or physical attacks on the person to harm, injure, or kill.
2. The use of shootings to kill or injure when the target party does not threaten the shooter in a combat situation.
3. The use of gas by throwing or shooting it into homes or by shooting it at persons.
4. Denial of medical care for the wounded.
5. Sweeping raids when soldiers and security forces are ordered, encouraged or allowed to rampage through houses and attack people.
6. Detention without limit, or with numerous extensions.
7. Prison conditions such that going to prison or jail subjects the arrestee to torture, harassment, denial of basic needs, denial of medical care and forced labor.
8. Kidnappings and abductions.
9. Vigilante violence which is encouraged, allowed or ignored by authorities.
10. Demolition of houses as a collective punishment.
11. Collective punishments used to induce fear in the populace such as curfews.

If the states selected for study fail to exhibit any exclusivist ideological factors which facilitate the use of state terror then the research will have determined for these particular countries that ideology and state terror are not associated as hypothesized.

The emphasis on ideological analysis is based on the importance of ideology recognized in the literature on state terrorism. The examination of ideology allows the researcher to see whether there is an ideological basis for state terrorism. It is important to see whether ideologies facilitate state terrorism by determining if they specify certain goals and objectives which call for extreme actions on the part of the state. It is assumed in this study that actions are based on ideas; policies are the practical means for shaping and designing the environment. Ideologies, like policy, may be opposed and fail or they may be modified. The interaction between ideology, policy and circumstances is an important one. Ideologies and their policy prescriptions are often successfully confronted by alternative ideologies and policies. Hopefully, research can identify what type of ideology facilitates state terror.

By analyzing two states comparatively, it may be possible to make generalizations leading to an enhanced and improved explanation of state terror. Any two states can be compared with the above methodology.

Before reviewing the available literature on state terrorism, certain terms are defined.

Definition of Terms

In order to address the issue of state terrorism it is necessary to provide the following definitions of the relevant terminology. For the purposes of this study, the following conceptual definitions will be used:

Facilitate - to make easier or less difficult; free from difficulty or impediment.⁴¹

Ideology - a systematic scheme or coordinated body of ideas or concepts with a sociopolitical program as prescription.⁴²

In-group - a group of people which is, according to ideological principles, granted the exclusive right to govern a state. For the purpose of this study, membership in the in-group is based on belonging to a particular ethnic, religious, national or racial group.⁴³

Out-group - a group of people denied equal participation in the governance of the state based on their belonging to a particular ethnic, religious, national or racial group.⁴⁴

Prescription - the process of laying down authoritative rules or directions, the action of laying down boundaries, limits, or restrictions, directions to remedy a problem.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield: G and C: Merriam, 1966), p. 812.

⁴² Ibid., p. 1123.

⁴³ This definition of In-group was constructed by the author based on Theodor Adorno's intergroup concept in The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

⁴⁴ This definition of Out-group was constructed by the author based on Theodor Adorno's out-group concept.

⁴⁵ Webster's, op. cit., p. 1792.

Regime - a method of ruling or management; a manner of administration. A form of government⁴⁶ or administration; a government or social system.

Repression - the use of coercion or the threat of coercion against people and groups pressing for reforms within the system or against opponents or potential opponents of the system, in order to block, prevent, control, or weaken their capability to oppose the authorities and their policies.⁴⁷

State - the operations, activities, or affairs of the government or ruling power of a country: the sphere of administration and supreme political power of a government.⁴⁸

State Security - a concept which can be defined in different ways depending on ideological perspectives. Frequently it is a concept which defines the security needs of a ruling group; the political system boundaries as defined by those in control of the coercive forces. Ideological principles can suggest either explicit and/or implicit prescriptions for state security. Although state security does represent security for some, for others the acts perpetrated in the name of state security are nothing less than enforced insecurity.⁴⁹

Terrorism - the purposeful act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a victim and/or audience of the act itself.⁵⁰ A system of government that uses terror to rule.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 1911.

⁴⁷ This definition of repression is drawn from a discussion of terms by Stohl and Lopez in The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984), Introductory chapter.

⁴⁸ Webster's, op. cit., p. 2228.

⁴⁹ This definition was constructed by the author.

⁵⁰ This definition of terrorism was drawn from Stohl, Lopez and Arendt. Arendt emphasizes the use of terror to rule.

Terrorism is defined by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators, not the nature of the cause, and as such, an objective definition is possible. The focus herein is on the act itself. Terrorism can be committed by individuals, groups, organizations and states.

The comparative literature on the South African and Israeli regimes substantiates the claim that ideology plays a vital role in determining security policies. The next two chapters examine exclusivist ideology, the activation of ideology through policy and the specific acts of military and security forces in the Occupied Territories and South Africa.

CHAPTER II

ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Ideology

This chapter looks at political Zionism and its prescriptions for state security as a means of checking to see if the Israeli state follows ideological prescriptions pertaining to the exclusive security of the Jewish community. The state is tested for its acquisition of land and resources for the use of the Jewish community. Israeli state policies are examined to see how they impact on the Palestinian population. These are the three variables which determine an exclusivist ideology.

Political Zionism (Jewish nationalism) is the guiding ideological foundation of the Israeli state. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948 established a "Jewish State" in Palestine with purposely undefined borders.¹ This event was the crowning achievement of the World Zionist Organization's fifty year campaign for the establishment of a Jewish state. Political Zionism explicitly calls for the establishment of a Jewish nation-state through the return and in-gathering of the worldwide Jewish community. Political Zionism is essentially Jewish nationalism.

¹ Uri Davis, Israel: An Apartheid State (London: Zed Books, 1987), p. 14.

Political Zionism is an ideology primarily concerned with the issues of security for the Jewish people and satisfies the criterion for an exclusive ideology. Golda Meir was "deeply convinced that every Jew must be a Zionist--out of the elementary necessity of Jewish self-protection."² Thus, its prescriptions vis-a-vis the Palestinians pertain only to the security needs of the Jewish (Zionist) community. Uri Davis expresses the general basis of political Zionism:

Political Zionism claims to offer a valid solution to the question of anti-Jewish racism: The establishment, through the Jewish colonization of Palestine of a sovereign, exclusively Jewish State; the transformation of Arab Palestine through the dispossession and mass transfer of the Palestinian Arab population, into Jewish Israel, an Israel that would, in the words of Haim Weizmann, subsequently first President of the State of Israel, "be as Jewish as America is American or England English."³

In its concern for the security of the Jewish community, political Zionism was forced early to address the presence of Palestinians. Political Zionism is explicit in defining the Palestinians as the out-group. Political Zionism stood for the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state in Palestine and the depopulation of the area in order to make way for Jewish settlement. Although Zionist leaders portrayed their ideology as one of national liberation and sent emissaries to

² Yuval Elizur and Eliahu Salpeter, Who Rules Israel? (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 35.

³ Davis, op. cit., p. 4.

Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, both refused to recognize political Zionism as a liberation movement.⁴

The present day Jewish state is faced with a security dilemma in the context of Zionist thought. In order to maintain a Jewish state wherein democratic structures pertain to the Jewish community it cannot extend full rights to the 1.5 million Palestinians who live under occupation. The conceptualization of security in Israel has been such that martial law, and policies of discrimination and expropriation were applied even to the Palestinian population within the Green Line (1949 Armistice Lines). Granting full and equal rights to Palestinians would mean the end of political Zionism and the loss of Jewish statehood.

In defining the Israeli system, Kimmerling argues for including the West Bank and Gaza primarily because Israeli economic integration policies have treated the territories as part of Greater Israel. In addition, ideology treats the areas as part of Israel and the areas have, as of now, been occupied for twenty-three years. The length of occupation is

⁴ Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi, The Israeli Connection: Who Arms Israel and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987) p. 23-24, and American Friends Service Committee, Peace and Justice Journal, Vol. 2, Number 4, April/May, 1988 (Dayton, Ohio: American Friends Service Committee).

a key factor in the choice to treat the areas as not simply temporarily occupied.⁵

It is important to find out what political Zionism prescribes for the treatment of the Palestinians who live under political Zionism.

Early and contemporary Zionist leaders were not hesitant to express their ideas on the subject. According to a theme within political Zionism, security of the Jewish state has in the past and may in the future require the use of widespread expulsion. Theodor Herzl, the founder of political Zionism, promoted transferring the Palestinians out of Palestine.⁶ The notion of expelling large numbers of Palestinians from territory on which they lived for centuries indicates the exclusive nature of political Zionism. Joseph Weitz (1890-1973) a long time high-ranking Zionist official reached the conclusion in 1940 that the Jewish state could for security reasons contain no more than 15% non-Jews. Transferring the Palestinians was "the only solution." Weitz made the

⁵ Baruch Kimmerling, "Making Conflict a Routine: Cumulative Effects of the Arab-Jewish Conflict Upon Israeli Society," Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict, edited by Moshe Lissak (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1984) p. 34-35.

⁶ Alan Taylor, "The Two Faces of Zionism," Judaism or Zionism, edited by International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (London: Zed Books, 1986) p. 71. Also see Israel Shahak, "A History of the Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionism," Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring, 1989, pp. 22-37.

exclusive character of political Zionism clear in his diary of 1940:

Among ourselves it must be clear that there is no place in the country for both peoples together...With the Arabs we shall not achieve our aim of being independent people in this country.⁷

Before he died in 1973, Weitz advocated the incorporation of the Occupied Territories and the transfer of Palestinians. The idea of transfer was put into practice during the 1948 war. Israeli forces terrorized hundreds of thousands of Palestinians into fleeing their homes as a means of clearing the territory for Jewish settlement. Flapan documents that, in all, between 600,000-700,000 Palestinians fled or were evicted by Zionist military forces.⁸ This experiment with transfer was surprisingly successful, as recent declassified documents show.⁹ The Israelis possessed overwhelming

⁷ Davis, op. cit., p. 5.

⁸ Simha Flapan, The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987) p. 83. Also Benny Morris, "The Causes and Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine," Middle East Studies, 22/1 (January, 1986), p. 9-11.

⁹ Morris, Ibid., p. 9-11. Morris made extensive use of declassified Israeli documents in his study of the Palestinian exodus. Also see Erskine Childers, "The Other Exodus," From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948, edited by Walid Khalidi (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987) p. 795-803. Also see Christopher Hitchens, "Broadcasts," Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question, edited by Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens (New York: Verso, 1988) p. 73.

superiority in equipment and number of forces.¹⁰ Palestinian villages were simply overrun by well-organized campaigns of terror including both psychological and physical aspects. During the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, 385 Palestinian villages were systematically destroyed by Israeli forces.¹¹

The logic behind expulsion (transfer) can be seen within the overall framework of Zionist ideology, i.e. the establishment of an exclusively Jewish state on land held exclusively for Jews.¹² One of the ideological questions dealt with under political Zionism concerns the geographic boundaries of Eretz Israel (the land of Israel). Eretz Israel includes "both banks of the Jordan from the Mediterranean Sea to the eastern desert."¹³ Thus the State of Israel, with or without the Occupied Territories, is smaller than the Land of Israel. According to political Zionism, state sovereignty has room for expansion. The present lack of defined borders

¹⁰ Stephan Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant Israel, 1948/1967 (Brattleboro: AMANA Books, 1984).

¹¹ Davis, op. cit., p. 17. See also Edward Said's book, The Question of Palestine (New York: New York Times Books, 1980).

¹² See the exclusive Israeli Law of Return which specifies that once any piece of land is in the hands of a Jew, it is considered to be Jewish land forever. Uri Davis discusses this law in Israel: An Apartheid State.

¹³ Daniel J. Elazar, Governing Peoples and Territories (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues/Jerusalem Institute for Federal Studies, 1982) p. 27.

emerges from the basic ideological outlook of political Zionism.

The Palestinian presence had to be addressed for the second time in the aftermath of the June 1967 war because of Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza (the Golan Heights do not play a direct role here). Today approximately 1.5 million Palestinians are subjected to Israeli military rule in the West Bank and Gaza. This Palestinian population is denied any form of genuine political expression. Palestinians have no rights under a system of martial law and are denied rights accorded to people under military occupation by the Geneva Convention.

Chomsky notes that although Israel considers itself a Western style democracy such a notion is contradictory because the "Jewishness" of the state is "built into the institutional structure and ideology in a fundamental manner and is subject to little internal challenge or debate."¹⁴ Chomsky points out that there is no fundamental difference between the Likud and Labour Parties with regard to the Occupied Territories. Both intend to control the areas. Both have been rejectionist vis-a-vis negotiations over the future of the territories. The State of Israel, Chomsky notes, is not the state of its

¹⁴ Noam Chomsky, Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982) p. 241.

citizens but "the sovereign state of the Jewish people."¹⁵ Although one sixth of Israeli citizens are non-Jewish, the state is by law to be Jewish. Security is the basis for this reality. Chomsky, like Arendt, maintains that rejection and denial of the Palestinians has long been a tenet of political Zionism.

As a state with undefined borders, Israel has had no compunction in systematically taking control of land and resources in the West Bank and Gaza. A process of land and resource expropriation has put 55% of the land and 75% of the water resources in the West Bank under Israeli control.¹⁶ The Palestinian population in these two areas stand in the way of Zionist aspirations to acquire the land and resources of what they consider Eretz Israel. Thus the Palestinians are identified simply as barriers to the accomplishment of the territorial objectives of political Zionism. In this sense they could be seen as the "superfluous" people Arendt wrote of as being so vulnerable to state violence. Their mere presence is considered a problem.

The Israeli occupation regime in the West Bank and Gaza has carried out the de facto annexation of land for the

¹⁵ Noam Chomsky, The Chomsky Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987) p. 377.

¹⁶ Sarah Graham-Brown, "The Economic Consequences of the Occupation," Occupation: Israel Over Palestine, edited by Naseer H. Aruri (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates Press, 1983) p. 177. Also see Middle East Report, May-June, 1988, p. 26.

ostensible reason of security. The de facto annexation has been so thorough that the West Bank as an entity hardly exists. However, when Menahem Begin was questioned about creeping annexation, he responded with, "You don't annex your own country."¹⁷

The "transfer" solution to the Palestinian presence has been recently advocated. In 1980, Member of the Knesset Aharon Yariv (former military intelligence chief and Minister of Information) said,

There are opinions which advocate that a war situation be utilized in order to exile 700-800 thousand Arabs. These opinions are widespread. Statements have been voiced on the matter and also instruments (apparatuses) have been prepared.¹⁸

Rehavam Ze'evi, retired General, a fifth generation sabra, member of Palmach, advisor to Prime Minister Rabin on terrorism, and former Central Command chief stated in 1989,

I was raised in the Labor movement. My father was among the leaders of MAPAI and a Histadrut leader. I have been a member of the Histadrut since the age of 17. I am a Leftist. All the views I now express are those of the Labor movement'...Two peoples can't live in our land. When they live in one land there is blood and fire'...To defend the Land of Israel we need the mountains of Judea and Samaria, the high ground'...It's a matter of strategic depth'...(To the "Ishmaelites") For the sake of peace, get out of here, so that our sons don't kill yours. So that you don't plant bombs in our public squares'...When we were attacked for our ideas a year ago we answered: everything carried out by Zionism over

¹⁷ Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn, 1987.

¹⁸ Davis, op. cit., p. 8-9.

the past¹⁹ 100 years has been precisely that--
transfer.

In March 1988, General Rafael Eitan assessed the Palestinian presence as a "security threat" to the Israeli state. Eitan told the Jerusalem Post: "If war breaks out and they make trouble, then we'll simply have to deport a million people."²⁰ In July 1987, Deputy Defense Minister Michael Dekel (Likud) called for mass expulsions of Palestinians. Some analysts have characterized the proposed population transfer option as the "Final Solution" to the Palestinian "problem."²¹

Thus, the forced transfer option is an idea taken seriously within policy making circles. In "extremist" circles, expulsion is readily advocated.

Rabbi Meir Kahane elected to the Knesset in 1984, openly calls for the forced transfer of 2 million Palestinians including those within the 1949 "Green Line." Kahane's Kach Party has forged an alliance with the extremist Gush Emunim settlements in the West Bank. Kahane points out that the logic of transfer is inherent in Zionist philosophy (he cites Weitz and Ben-Gurion). The Kach Party uses religious justification for advocating transfer. Kahane writes,

¹⁹ MERIP, March-April, 1989, p. 21.

²⁰ Palestine Focus, July-August, 1988, p. 5. Cited from The Jerusalem Post.

²¹ Ibid., p. 5.

The analysis and proposed transfer of Arabs from Israel that I have set down are not personal views. They are certainly not political ones. This is the Jewish outlook, based on halakah the law as postulated in the Torah.²²

Kahane likens the Palestinians to a cancer: "They are becoming a cancer in our body...They are waiting for the moment to hit us."²³ Kahane sees the Jewish state as an organic unit threatened by the presence of people who by his definition have no right to live in the territory of Palestine. Although Kahane is considered an extremist his prescription for the security of the Zionist state is not contradictory with mainstream Zionist tenets (ideology as expressed by Herzl, Weitz, Yarov, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion).

According to recent polls, transfer as a "solution" to the security dilemma facing the Israeli state is supported by almost half the Israeli population.²⁴ Expulsion is seen as a means of maintaining a Zionist society. Approximately 30% of the population supports relinquishing the Occupied Territories; however, it is important to note that very few Israelis support the establishment of an independent

²² Meir Kahane, They Must Go (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1981) p. 267.

²³ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁴ Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter, 1989, "The Transfer Option," p. 161. Reprint of article in Jerusalem Post, International Edition, August 20, 1988. Also see MERIP, May-June, 1988, for polls.

Palestinian state. Most of the 30% still insist on the Jordanian option.

Although there are different views within the realm of political Zionism, the reader will see that when it comes to what constitutes state security, there is a great deal of unity. Very few political Zionists recognize Palestinian self-determination as a legitimate right.

Michael Jansen has described four general schools of Zionist ideology.²⁵ The first is messianically based Zionism which is a reaction against the assimilationist tendencies brought about during and following the Age of Enlightenment. The objective of messianic Zionism was to preserve the distinctiveness of the Jewish people. Rabbi Kook, the father of modern messianic Zionism, emigrated to Jaffa in 1904 and began preparing for the "end of days." Kook's doctrines of Land, Tora, and People form the basis of the contemporary Gush Emunim movement.

Messianic militarism was, according to Michael Jansen, disoriented by the debate on Lebanon (1982). Jansen sees Israeli society as polarized on the issues of security, the ultra-nationalists vs. those supporting a smaller Israel.

The second political Zionist ideology is a combination of liberal and enlightened messianic thought. This school of

²⁵ Michael Jansen, Dissonance in Zion (London: Zed Books, 1987) pp. 4-9. Also see Jansen's schematic for Israeli political parties, pp. 132-136.

thought is called spiritual Zionism and has both secular and religious followers. Historically the spiritual Zionists have been critical of acts against Palestinians, and spiritual Zionist leaders like Chaim Arlosoroff sought to arrive at some level of cooperation and understanding with the Palestinian community. Arlosoroff was assassinated by Revisionist Zionists due to his efforts at forging links with Palestinians. Today spiritual Zionists are, in general, supportive of a withdrawal from the Occupied Territories, and a return to the 1967 borders. Some members support the Jordanian option, and a few support a two state solution. Generally followers of spiritual Zionism are on the political left. Mezvinsky notes the marginal role played by humanitarian Zionists like Martin Buber and Judah Magnes, each of whom influenced some Israelis. Ultimately, they were rejected outright in favor of Ben-Gurion's version of Zionism. In contrast to Ben-Gurion, Magnes and Buber advocated the establishment of a democratic binational state in Palestine.²⁶

The third Zionist typology is the democratic-socialist or labour Zionist ideology. The primary concern of the Labour Zionists was directed towards liberating the Jewish masses from capitalist exploitation and anti-semitism, and included a strong reaction against assimilationist tendencies. Large numbers of Labour Zionists existed within the kibbutzim,

²⁶ Norton Mezvinsky, "Zionism--Rejection of Dissent: The Case of Buber and Magnes," The Search, Winter, 1985.

Histadrut (trade union) and Haganah (military) organizations. These three organizations were the foundational institutions for the new Jewish state. Although socialism played a role in economic organizational matters it was not a concept of socialism extended to non-Jewish communities. Labour party membership and leadership was and is opposed to an independent Palestinian state. Labour, despite Hussein's declaration, still promotes the Jordanian option.

The fourth ideological strain of political Zionism is the Revisionist school of thought. Revisionism was born in 1922 as a reaction to what some Zionist's perceived to be a British betrayal, i.e., British withdrawal from commitment to establishing the Jewish National Home in the whole of Palestine including Transjordan. Chaim Weizmann and David Ben-Gurion were pragmatic in their approach to the problem and chose to appease the British rather than reject outright their proposals. Vladimir Jabotinsky rejected any rhetoric, however pragmatic, which sought to limit the proposed Jewish state. Jabotinsky organized a guerrilla movement against the British and the Palestinians. The Revisionists rejected the UN Partition Plan of November, 1947. However, when the Haganah secured 82% of Palestine in 1947-1949, and the remaining 18% in 1967, the Revisionists had reason to be more satisfied with the situation. Revisionists today belong to a number of political parties all of which are opposed to

withdrawing from the Occupied Territories and opposed to negotiations with the PLO.

Jansen, in Dissonance in Zion, points out that in the post- 1948 era the four schools of Zionism formed two overall political groupings. The "spiritual and moderate" messianic Zionists joined Labour. Militant messianics and the Revisionists comprised the second grouping. With the election of Menachem Begin in 1977 the Revisionists came to power. Since that year Labour has been in a slow state of decline.

While Jansen marks the real ascendancy of the Revisionists in 1977, Arendt maintains the Revisionist ideology has guided the Israeli state since 1944.²⁷ Arendt shows the Revisionist prescriptions regarding security questions to be an inherent part of Labour policies. While Jansen sees Herzl as a social-democrat, Arendt judges him to be a Revisionist, more nationalist and socialist. Flapan contends that the blow to Arab-Jewish rapprochement ended in 1942 with the passage of the Zionist Biltmore Program. Although basically in agreement with Arendt, Jansen emphasizes the fact that Labour's close relations with the U.S. prohibited an outright call for annexation and the creation of Greater Israel. Jansen's analysis indicates the use of the two track policy, one dedicated to diplomatic maneuvers, the

²⁷ Hannah Arendt, The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (New York: Grove Press, 1978) p. 131. Arendt wrote "Zionism Reconsidered" in 1944.

other to military successes. A more recent example is the diplomatic appearance of nonannexation of the West Bank and Gaza. Creeping annexation nevertheless became evident in the Allon Plan.

Arendt points out the significance of the 1944 World Zionist Organization's unanimously-adopted resolution calling for a Jewish state which would "embrace the whole of Palestine, undivided and undiminished."²⁸ Arendt marks this as a decisive turning point towards Jabotinsky's Revisionist Zionism and hence a severe defeat for Zionists who thought some accommodation with the Palestinians could be reached. The turn to Revisionist Zionism in 1944 could be marked as the point at which the Zionist leadership decided to rule out any form of non-exclusive political program.

Arendt traces the Revisionist ideology to Herzl's version of nationalism and its most important element--the ideological prescription of transfer called for with regard to the Palestinian presence. Revisionist Zionism claims all of Palestine and Transjordan as exclusively Jewish territories. Accordingly, Palestinians should be expelled to Iraq.²⁹ The ideological prescription of expulsion as an option within the overall framework of political Zionism has been identified as an issue of national security. In order to have a Jewish

²⁸ Ibid., p. 131.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 134, 136.

state, to preserve an exclusively Jewish democracy, the state of Israel cannot allow more than 15% of its citizens to be non-Jews. Internal security is thus defined and governed by the basic demographic tenets of political Zionism.

Beit-Hallahmi's analysis of political Zionism maintains that it has always had right-wing orientations towards the Palestinians and the so-called Third World. The Revisionist security prescriptions have been a part of political Zionism all along. Beit-Hallahmi maintains the Labour Zionists throughout the 1950's and 1960's pursued policies commensurate with the Political Zionist conceptualization of security. Beit-Hallahmi writes:

But Zionism has clear, inescapable ideological implications in terms of dealing with the Third World. Zionism meant the creation of Jewish sovereignty in Palestine through settlement and political domination. Thus by definition it entails an attack on the indigenous population, and a confrontation with the Third World.³⁰

Beit-Hallahmi goes on to explain Israeli reactionary policies:

The idea of liberation for Third World groups threatens the very essence of Zionism. Concepts of human rights are too dangerous for the Israeli political system. Any serious examination of Israeli policies in the Third World must inevitably lead to a radical critique of Zionism and its political aims. This explains why such an examination is not likely to be undertaken in Israel or to gain following there'...If you start talking about equality, liberation and self-determination, you will soon encounter a problem: you must then consider these ideals in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. Small wonder, then,

³⁰ Beit-Hallahmi, op. cit., p. 229.

that Israel is opposed to liberation movements in the Third World.³¹

According to this description, political Zionism is such that it has no room for even considering the rights of the non-Jewish population. Political Zionism establishes an asymmetrical relationship with outsiders.

The relationship between Israeli external and internal policy is shown by Beit-Hallahmi's analysis of Shimon Peres' 1959 request to France to lease French Guiana for use as a colonial resource:

This strange exemplary tale of modern colonialism reflects a certain way of seeing the world and of seeing people in the world. In a sense, the Peres Guiana plan is a replay of the Zionist plan in Palestine. It is identical with nineteenth-century colonialization schemes for Africa and South America. From the Zionist point of view, Palestine in the late nineteenth century was an empty wasteland, waiting to be "developed" and changed. The country--along with the natives if there were any--was simply a natural resource to be exploited, an element of nature. The natives were not part of the Peres plan. They were not even mentioned. Likewise the natives of Palestine had no place in the Zionist vision. Their existence and their rights were simply not part of the equation. It is this worldview that Peres was extending in South America, in his vision for the future of Guiana. It is the same worldview that Israeli leaders extend to the Third World of today.³²

Beit-Hallahmi's study indicates that the manner in which political Zionism relates to the external world is commensurate with the way it operationalizes its ideas

³¹ Ibid., p. 236.

³² Ibid., p. 231.

internally. Like Beit-Hallahmi, Maxime Rodinson holds the colonial-settler nature of political Zionism responsible for Israel's treatment of the Palestinians, but some scholars (Adam) have suggested that the Israeli state is not colonial because there is no temporary mandate, protectorate or colonial quality to the Israeli presence. Instead the Israeli presence is permanent.

In order to carry out the principles expressed by political Zionism, the state has been embroiled in conflict, an adversarial relationship with the Palestinian population and Arab neighbors. Israeli society has become militarized.

The pervasive concern for security based on political Zionism has had logical results:

Military victory created the new state; and, like Sparta or Prussia, on military virtue it remained based. The militarization of life and mind represented not only a break with humanist Zionism, but with the long history of Judaism. The *Zeitgeist* of twentieth-century Central and Eastern Europe, had won out over Jewish tradition.³³

The Zeitgeist referred to here is that of Revisionist Zionism. Jansen contends that the "military virtue" was primarily a means of unifying the people and expanding the state; it was not primarily an organization limited to defensive requirements. The "task of Zionism" (expansion)

³³ Michael Jansen, op. cit., p. 27. Jansen cites Hans Kohn, an authority on modern nationalism. Kohn evaluates Israeli nationalism as based on military virtues. Kohn was a spiritual Zionist who left Palestine before the declaration of the Israeli state. Kohn's article, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea" in The Menorah Journal, Autumn-Winter, 1958, is the source of this quote.

was unfinished in 1949 and still is to this day. Jansen's analysis has the Israeli state embarking on a two track policy in the post 1949 era. One track consisted of diplomacy and conciliation while the other was the building up of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Leaders of both tracks were dedicated to the same goals through different means. Security for the state of Israel was expressed by Jabotinsky's "Iron Wall" doctrine--essentially a fortress state. In order to create the fortress state Ben-Gurion removed military issues from the political arena and made them autonomous concerns of state security. Yoram Peri contends that,

Zionist ideology'...has as one of its major components military self-reliance or, in the phrase of Max Nordau, a follower of Herzl, 'muscular Judaism.' Thus security was raised to the level of ideology and sanctified, the Army made a symbol of identification and glorification a 'supreme value.'³⁴

The 1967 victory once and for all established the centrality of security in Israeli life, the IDF was the institutional benefactor. The IDF's relationship to the Occupied Territories is expressed by Jansen:

An ideological army bound to the major tenets of Zionism, the IDF could not but devise a policy, contrary to international law, of changing the status quo in the occupied territories in order to secure them for Israel. The policy it devised involved acquisition by settlement; it was embodied in the Allon Plan which envisioned military

³⁴ Ibid., p. 28-31.

settlements in "security zones" as a first stage absorption programme.³⁵

In the post 1967 era Israelis committed to traditional Zionist ideology demanded the extension of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza. The West Bank and Gaza were, soon after the 1967 war, subjected to "disguised annexation" under the command of General Dayan. The areas were carefully integrated with infrastructures behind the Green Line in hope of preventing any future repatriation of the territory. Nevertheless there were and still are problems to this policy; Uri Davis points out how the security situation became greatly complicated in the Zionist view after the 1967 war due to the presence of 1.3 million Palestinians. However, Davis contends that in the post-1967 era, Israel's "war initiative" is restricted, making it more difficult to orchestrate a large forced expulsion under the cover of battle.³⁶ However, as stated earlier, Israeli polls show approximately half the population in support of "transfer." Ideologically it is a view many Israelis support whether comfortably or not.

The elevation of security to an ideological plane has been operationalized by the Israeli Defense Forces and security forces. Political Zionism is synonymous (in the Zionist perspective) with Jewish security. The role that

³⁵ Ibid., p. 40-41.

³⁶ Davis, op. cit., p. 65.

ideology plays in the Israeli conceptualization of security was articulated by General Israel Tal:

It was always self-evident, a universal truth that power is synonymous with independence and statism. But we always perceived security not as an independent entity but as an organic part of a larger complex of values and aims.³⁷

Baruch Kimmerling states that "the Israeli social system has undergone a process of adaptation to the external conflict through partial routinization."³⁸ Such routinization includes two points:

1. The development of a mentality which perceives the conflict as a permanent condition or destiny of society.
2. The creation of built-in social mechanisms and institutional arrangements for coping with conflict at maximum efficiency and minimum cost.³⁹

Eliezer Schweid suggests these factors require the "mobilization of all the forces of existence in order to exist."⁴⁰ Thus, exclusively Jewish security is the central theme for the state and populace under political Zionism.

Shavit maintains that the manner in which ideology influences the national policy of Likud is key to understanding security issues in Israeli politics. Shavit suggests that a transformation of Israeli politics took place

³⁷ Lissak, op. cit., p. 11. General Tal expresses the ideological aspect of the military as an enforcer of security.

³⁸ Kimmerling, op. cit., p. 13.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 13-14.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

upon the election of the Likud Party after many years of Labour Party government.

Shavit contends that national policy in Israel is shaped by "the rather unique combination within the Zionist Israeli context of national-historical concepts, foreign and security policy, and settlement policy."⁴¹ Shavit points out that ideology is the basis of action; at the same time ideology is often the tool of rationalizing certain acts. Ideology can both determine acts and rationalize acts after they have been carried out. In 1977, for the first time Likud leaders (Herut-Revisionism) got the chance to implement their policies as they saw fit. But Shavit, unlike Arendt, does not think Revisionism in security affairs has always been an integral part of political Zionism.

The most important aspect of Likud centers on the land of Israel, "Arabs were seen not only as a political enemy but as a metaphysical, existential one."⁴² Palestinian presence on territory claimed by the tenets of political Zionism meant they would either have to be excluded from equal participation

⁴¹ Yaacov Shavit, "Ideology World View and National Policy: The Case of the Likud Government, 1977-1984," The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 9/2, 1987, p. 102. Shavit defines ideology as "certain declared political and social opinions, to a well-defined formulated systematic group of goals and aims (the value dimension) as well as the means and methods for attaining them (the operative dimension)." Worldview (Weltanschauung) is a system of symbols and values, historical factors, visions of the future, all of which "nurture" ideology. Policy is the translation of ideology into action.

⁴² Ibid., p. 105.

in the political system or forcibly removed as a means of altering the demographic picture of the area. From 1977 on, Revisionist Zionism was modified somewhat to a more religious orientation of messianic Zionism--the language of messianic Zionism was used. Begin was caught between Revisionism and its bluntness vis-a-vis security and borders, and its new messianic language, and the necessity of conducting pragmatic politics requiring sophisticated tactical and strategic maneuvers. Likud, as Labour had done in the past, was forced to be pragmatic in the policy struggle to accomplish ideological goals. The blunt language of annexation was not officially used; nevertheless political "facts" (settlement) on the ground marched ahead.

Ben-Yehuda and Averbach conducted an analysis of conflict attitudes on the part of Menachim Begin and Moshe Dayan and found five ideological tenets frequently articulated by the two leaders:

1. No negotiations between Israel and the PLO;
2. No independent Palestinian state;
3. No foreign sovereignty in the West Bank and Gaza Region;
4. United Jerusalem to remain the capital of Israel; and
5. Israeli settlements throughout the entire land of Israel.⁴³

⁴³ Joel Beinin, "Israel: The Political Economy of a Garrison State and Its Future," The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures, edited by Hisham Sharabi (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) p. 241.

These five postulates form a cohesive normative approach that rules out the option of rapprochement with the PLO and serves as an ideological guide for policy formation on the Palestinian issue.

Israel Shahak contends that in order for Israel to enforce the principles of political Zionism, it must implement harsh policies.

Shahak bluntly defines Israeli society as having many totalitarian features and maintains these features are actually strongest in the Labour party. Shahak cites security laws, the predominant role of the military in Israeli society, and treatment of the Palestinians as examples of totalitarianism.⁴⁴

Shahak contends that Israel is preparing to expel large numbers of Palestinians. In order to accomplish this, the Israeli media are preparing the public for the eventual "necessity" of expulsion. Shahak contends this move towards expulsion is being gradually introduced through the media in the same way the public was incrementally exposed to the idea of invading Lebanon in 1982.⁴⁵ According to Shahak, Israeli authorities can contemplate such actions because the state is not democratic in the full sense of the word.

⁴⁴ Israel Shahak, "Israeli Apartheid and the Intifada," Race and Class, 30/1, 1988, p. 1.

⁴⁵ Israel Shahak, Middle East International, 23.September 1988.

The implementation of certain policies leads observers to determine what kind or type of regime exists in a given nation-state. Richard Falk, writing in 1979 determined Israel to be pre-authoritarian. Israel Shahak contends that Israel's leadership has strong totalitarian tendencies from the socialization they received under the dictatorial systems of Tsarist Russia, Rumania and East Europe. These regimes offered no models of democratic government. Joel Beinin categorizes Israel as a garrison state wherein the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) have "always been a central institution in Israeli society."⁴⁶ Kimmerling's analysis shows a mentality in Israel which perceives "conflict as a permanent condition or destiny of society" which leads "to the need to mobilize all the forces of existence."⁴⁷ Peri contends that Israel's ideologically-oriented armed forces combine elements present in communist and professional military forces. The security and military forces were dominated by Labour party members until 1977 when it became evident that Labour was losing influence. Clearly ideological factors play a guiding role in Israel's military forces.⁴⁸ Lissak maintains there are no significant boundaries between the defense and civilian

⁴⁶ Joel Beinin, "Israel: The Political Economy of a Garrison State and Its Future," The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures edited by Hisham Sharabi (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988) p. 241.

⁴⁷ Lissak, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 46.

sectors in Israel. Some authors, Perlmutter and Horowitz, agree that there is a very close relationship and overlapping between Israeli civilian and military sectors but to them this does not connote militarism or less democracy.⁴⁹ However, Kimmerling points out that democracy in Israel applies to Jewish citizens, hence the application of a generalization about democracy in Israel is limited. Evidence shows that the democratic pluralistic structures and attributes of the Israeli system exist for only a narrowly defined group of people. Thus there are, essentially, two Israeli regimes. One pertaining to full citizens and one pertaining to people who come under the governance of the state but have no rights.

Security Policies in the Occupied Territories

Shavit has defined policy as "the practical translation of ideology." The previous analysis of political Zionism indicates that both the Labour and Likud Parties share the same ideological conclusions with regard to security. However, they have different policy approaches to accomplish basically the same end. The ideological prescription of securing the land of Israel is central to Israeli state policy. Shavit suggests that worldview and ideology, although related, differ in the sense that similar worldviews can be expressed differently by different people, while ideology is more precise. In the previous section, we examined what

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 43.

political Zionism specifies for the Palestinians. At this point it is necessary to see whether, and if so how, these prescriptions translated into operationalized policies. This entails looking at the regime in place in the Occupied Territories. Once certain ideological prescriptions are revealed it is then necessary to see if they are mere rhetoric and thus potentialities or whether in fact they have been translated into acts.

Kimmerling found that most political and sociological analyses tend to overlook the inhabitants of the Occupied Territories because the areas are not yet de jure parts of Israel and military occupation and governance have not formally been announced as permanent. However, one could question the efficacy of studying Israel while ignoring the territories based on the following facts: (1) the occupation has been in place for a long time; (2) it has been accompanied by land and resource expropriation on a wide scale; (3) it is seen as part of Eretz Israel in terms of Zionist ideology; (4) it has been integrated economically; and (5) is thought of as being under the general security and strategic umbrella of the Israeli state.⁵⁰ Thus if one limits one's study to Israeli pluralistic democracy a great deal about the state is ignored because attention is focused primarily on a parliamentary system wherein political pluralism is overwhelmingly in the

⁵⁰ Kimmerling, Ibid., p. 35.

hands of the elected representatives of the Jewish population. Indeed, democracy is present with the system, but has been established primarily for one segment of the population.

It is worthwhile to examine the Israeli regime in the Occupied Territories and check to see whether tenets of political Zionism are translated into security policies.

Martial law based on the 1945 Defense Emergency Regulations subjects all Palestinians in Israel (this was the Israel of the 1949 Armistice boundaries) and the Occupied Territories to military government. In reference to martial law, Davis comments, "The characterization of the state of Israel as being permanently in a state of emergency is not only a political statement but perhaps more significantly, a legal statement."⁵¹ From 7 June 1967 to the present, Martial Law has been imposed on the West Bank and Gaza. The Golan Heights (1981), East Jerusalem and surrounding areas (1967, 1973) have been annexed by the State of Israel. Creeping annexation from 1967 to the present has resulted in the annexation of 52-55% of the West Bank and 30-34% of Gaza. While Israeli civil law (extended to the Occupied Territories in 1967) applies to settlers it is martial rule, except on rare occasions, which applies to the non-citizen Palestinian population (1.5 million). As seen earlier, both people and land have been subject to the impact of military rule. The

⁵¹ Davis, op. cit., p. 64.

annexation of land is first and foremost justified on security grounds.

The West Bank is occupied by two brigades and collateral forces all under the centralized command of the military-governor. Executive, legislative and judicial authority is implemented by decree issued by the military governor and his staff. Policies are made by the governor and carried out by his staff officers. Some 1,100 decrees have been issued by the military government.⁵²

The military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza can be evaluated in terms of the following distinct periods, 1967-1977; 1977-1987, and 1987 to the present. During each period, there were turning points towards harsher repression and more extensive land expropriation and the consequent Palestinian reaction by protesting and demonstrating.

The first stage of occupation was dominated by the policies of Moshe Dayan, then Minister of Defense.⁵³ Dayan thought the Palestinian community could be co-opted and pacified through a sophisticated policy which on the one hand granted some forms of local autonomy, and on the other, was

⁵² Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984) p. 24, and The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) p. 37.

⁵³ Geoffrey Aronson, Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987) For a description of the periods of differing Israeli rule.

sharply repressive against those who refused to conform to Israeli rule. Dayan's policies were not successful in containing or eliminating Palestinian nationalism and this was clearly evident by the mid-1970's. During 1970-1971, there was a short-lived armed rebellion in Gaza utilizing caches of arms left by the Egyptians. The Commander at the time, General Sharon carried out a harsh pacification operation in Gaza to put down the rebellion. Despite a major crackdown on the Palestine National Front in Spring, 1974, the Israeli military government could not prevent the widespread expression of nationalism through demonstrations. Dayan was, however, successful in completing the economic subordination of the Occupied Territories to Israel. For all practical purposes, there ceased to be a distinction between the two economies. Land expropriation on security grounds and for the purposes of Israeli settlement incrementally increased during these years. By 1973, the ideas of invisible occupation contemplated in Dayan's policies (1967-1973) were no longer invisible. The relative calm of 1967-1973 is evident by the statement of an Israeli reservist:

Up to 1973, you could spend your army service in the West Bank sitting and drinking coffee, lean your rifle against the wall and chat with the locals."⁵⁴

After 1973, a permanent state of low-intensity warfare existed in the Occupied Territories.

⁵⁴ Journal of Palestine Studies, Autumn, 1987.

The election of pro-PLO mayors in 1976 indicated the widespread popularity of nationalism. The relative calm of the 1967-1973 era was largely due to the pro-Hashemite, non-nationalist orientations of older Palestinian community leaders. However, the rise of a nonviolent protest/demonstration movement with networks throughout the territories soon discredited any notion of maintaining the status quo. The Land Day (March 31, 1976) protest within the Green Line and in the Occupied Territories was met with Israeli gunfire which left six demonstrators dead. After 1976, the use of shootings at demonstrations became an ever-increasing response on the part of the Israeli military and security forces. The Land Day protest of 1976 marks a point at which the Israeli military and security forces thought force would crush the increasing rise of nationalism.

The increasing despair under the impact of land expropriation was enhanced in 1979 when Israel declared most of the West Bank territory "state lands" and made it available for settlement.

In 1977, according to Aruri, it became apparent to the military regime that the Palestinian community was overwhelmingly in favor of resistance and would not be contained or co-opted by the policies of Dayan. Prime Minister Begin immediately implemented the "iron fist" policy in the Occupied Territories. Repression and severe violations

of Human Rights increased dramatically.⁵⁵ The Christian Science Monitor reported that attacks on writers, students and demonstrators were accompanied by indiscriminate mass punishments, curfews, school closings, banishment of families, and public humiliations. The Jalazone refugee camp was put under total curfew for twelve days. It is important to take note that the "Iron Fist" policy went hand in hand with the Camp David process.

Aronson marks 1979 as the beginning of a new and more severe crackdown on the Palestinian communities. The crackdown on Bir Zeit University and Bethlehem University were notable turning points towards harsher military actions. Clashes between settlers and Palestinians were common occurrences. Aronson contends that the "Iron Fist" policy was implemented in mid-1980 in conjunction with a policy of annexing land more rapidly in order to satisfy internal political forces demanding the extension of Israeli sovereignty. By 1980, it was again clear that no Palestinian leadership could be created to support the autonomy plan of Begin and the Camp David Accords. General Eitan, Chief of Staff, and other military officers,

saw the occupied territories as a battleground to be won, and had no sense that Israel would benefit from a political solution to the problems of its rule..In their view, the problems of the West Bank

⁵⁵ Naseer Aruri, op. cit., p. 15.

and Gaza Strip were military problems, requiring the use of military power.⁵⁶

Instructions were given to soldiers to attack and beat curfew violators and "...if someone causes trouble, throws stones or something, first break his bones and then put him on the vehicle that will take him to the military headquarters."⁵⁷ Upon release from detention, Palestinians were given memos in Hebrew for presentation to IDF patrols which read, "Hit him and let him pass."⁵⁸ Aronson reports that one observer of the shootings of 16 students at Bir Zeit University was convinced of the "widely held view that the military government was doing more to provoke unrest than to contain it."⁵⁹ Evidence from films showing Israeli troops on rooftops firing on students throwing stones indicates the clearly aggressive intentions of Israeli troops. The repressive policies intensified in the post-1977 era in incremental stages to 1982 when Israeli forces confronted demonstrators with lethal force on a daily basis. The West Bank military commander ordered troops:

⁵⁶ Aronson, op. cit., p. 214.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 216. For descriptions of Israeli treatment of Palestinians see entire section.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 216.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 223.

to shoot at solar water heaters, break watches, to assemble passersby or people outside their homes in groups of six or eight to beat them up."⁶⁰

Palestinians were forced to sing the Israeli national anthem or shout insults at one another. Busloads of people were driven out far from their homes and then made to walk home. One soldier explained to a journalist that his role while on patrol was to "instill fear" in the local populace. His job included forcing children in school yards to play and not stand around in groups. He revealed that oral orders for arrests were common procedure. Widespread indiscriminate beatings were becoming routine in early 1982. (General Orr gave written instructions authorizing "punishments.") Aronson reports that the Israeli command wanted to provoke a conflict and used vigilante settlers as one means of accomplishing this objective. Clashes between settlers and the local Palestinian populace became more and more intense commensurate with the impact of creeping annexation and waves of harsh crackdowns ordered by the military authorities. Apparently a premature rebellion would offer the chance for mass arrests and to preempt growing resistance.

The Palestinian protest in the Spring of 1982 was largely a reaction of resistance against the increasingly severe form of military occupation manifested by the Iron Fist policies. Military officers in the West Bank and Gaza referred to the

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 282.

inhabitants as "local bacteria;" General Orr (IDF Commander of the West Bank) spoke of the Arabs as valuing life less than others; soldiers in the Mapam Party received briefings "that would not shame a fascist military regime," and Prime Minister Begin referred to PLO commandos as "two-legged beasts of prey who are thirsting for Jewish blood."⁶¹ All Palestinians were seen as potential "two-legged beasts of prey." By the end of Spring 1982, Palestinian sources reported twelve Palestinians killed and over two hundred injured. Israeli sources reported two soldiers killed, thirty-three injured. No demonstrations in the post 1967 period had been as intense as those of Spring 1982.

Israeli security sources claimed that a large number of injured would result in the disintegration of demonstrations and the realization on the part of the Palestinians that the costs of dissent are too high.⁶² The initial implementation of state terror as a policy by security forces can be traced back to the collapse of Dayan's co-optation policies and the consequent increased visibility of the occupying forces. Once it became obvious that Sharon and Begin's Civilian Administration (established in 1981 alongside the Military Government) was incapable of producing a non-nationalistic "local autonomy" leadership the military responded with

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 290.

⁶² Ibid., p. 291-293.

increased repression. The complete failure of the Civil Administration was evident by 1982. General Sharon stated in reference to the 1982 disturbances, "Our actions should be viewed as yet another phase in a continuous struggle as part of a farsighted plan...."⁶³ The demonstrations of 1982 cannot be understood without considering Lebanon. The plan Sharon spoke of above was revealed in summer 1982 as the invasion of Lebanon, an action designed to eliminate the PLO. Sharon proudly referred back to his "pacification operation" in Gaza during 1970-1971 as a basis for the invasion of Lebanon and the crackdown on the Occupied Territories. The Gaza rebellion of 1970-1971 was armed, but of small scale and qualitatively different when compared to the widespread unarmed demonstration of 1982. From 1976 on, the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories began to express large scale resistance to the occupation. No longer were they waiting on liberation from the outside. The popular political challenge to Israeli presence clearly dominated the scene in 1982. However, the demonstrations were mostly uncoordinated and spontaneous popular reactions to intensified repression. Sharon viewed the challenge as war. The situation in Lebanon was integrally related to Israeli security interests in the West Bank and Gaza. Hence Sharon insisted on trying to destroy the PLO in

⁶³ Ibid., p. 293.

Lebanon as a means of securing the Occupied Territories and with the aim of destroying Palestinian nationalism.

The Israeli failure to totally crush the PLO and establish a Christian Phalangist-dominated Lebanon did not signal a change in Israeli policies in the Occupied Territories.

Although the "Iron Fist" policy was already in place, Defense Minister Rabin announced on 4 August 1985 a more intensified version which included increased usage of the following practices: detention up to six months without charges or trial (renewable); deportation; town arrest, house sealings and demolitions; closure of institutions, organizations and schools.

By November 1986 former deputy mayor of Jerusalem Meron Benvenisti, author of The West Bank Data Project, concluded that the status quo of military occupation in the West Bank and Gaza would not change. According to Benvenisti time had run out for any hope of reconciliation.

The level of repression had increased greatly between 1982 and 1987. Bir Zeit and Bethlehem Universities were particular targets of the Israeli military. Students were frequently subjected to lethal shootings. The IDF increasingly employed battlefield tactics against demonstrations and protests. Stones, placards, flags, slogans, and mass demonstrations by school age youth and university students were the enemy. The December 1986

shooting of Bir Zeit University students touched off massive waves of demonstrations and protests in the Spring of 1987. On 28 October 1987 at Bethlehem University, an Israeli officer and sniper identified a protest leader, Abu Surur, and shot him from a nearby rooftop with a 22mm sniper rifle. Israeli forces prevented ambulances from attending to victims.⁶⁴

It is interesting to note that some evidence indicates there was, in 1985, Jordanian collusion with Israel's crackdown on nationalists in the Occupied Territories. Upon the initiation of Rabin's "Iron First" policy in August 1985 there appeared to be coordination between Israel and Jordan regarding Jordan's proposed \$1.2 billion development plan for the Occupied Territories, Jordan's short-lived agreement with Arafat, and Israel's crackdown in the Occupied Territories. In 1985, Hussein cracked down severely on PLO supporters in Jordan. This may have been a last effort to impose some sort of Israeli-Jordanian solution to the conflict.⁶⁵ Some Palestinian nationalists suspect Jordan and Israel secretly coordinate their policies in hopes of eliminating Palestinian nationalism.

Starting in December 1987, the Palestinian community was in a position to challenge the occupation in a coordinated, sustained, and widespread manner. Throughout 1987, the

⁶⁴ Middle East International, December 19, 1987.

⁶⁵ MERIP, January-February, 1988, p. 44.

situation in Gaza and the West Bank was characterized by intense clashes between primarily young Palestinians and the occupying forces. Initially, the clashes in Gaza were the most violent. In Gaza, after the head of the military police was assassinated (2 August), curfews and travel bans were imposed. By the end of Spring 1987, seven Palestinians had been killed, scores wounded, and hundreds detained. Israeli settlers were allowed to go on a rampage, breaking into houses, beating youths and "terrorizing the population" in West Bank areas, all in "retaliation" for stone throwing along the highways.⁶⁶ The Jerusalem Press Daily from the Occupied Territories (9 February 88) reports that on 1 October 1987, it became "habit" for both the occupation army and Israeli Settlers to murder Palestinians. Nine Palestinians, eight of whom were from Gaza, were shot by IDF troops and settlers between 1 October 1987 and 8 December 1987. On October 6, 1987, a shootout in Gaza left four Palestinians and one Israeli intelligence officer dead. The underlying causes of rising violence in 1987 are accounted for in the following passage:

Underlying both the tumultuous autumn and the somnolent summer is the steady erosion of individual Palestinian and collective rights. This has become a structural feature of the occupation. There may be a year when the universities are not closed, a period when deportation ceases as a practice. Sometimes freedom of expression or assembly can surpass the occupiers' formal constraints. But the unsolved contradictions between Israel's colonial

⁶⁶ MERIP, January-February, 1988, p. 3.

project and Palestinian nationalism lead almost inevitably to mounting systemic violations (land confiscation, takeover of infrastructure) and individual abuses. The passage of time lends a further dynamic, what Meron Benvenisti calls "the significance of routine." The current phase, the "iron fist" policy introduced in August 1985, has brought a substantial increase in clear cut human rights violations. One of the more striking is this routinization of repression.⁶⁷

Amnesty International recognized in 1987 the increasingly violent actions of the military occupation forces and expressed throughout that year its concerns.

Prior to the recent uprising, the Arab Studies Society (Jerusalem) published a report on the steady increase of violence on the part of the IDF over the years just prior to 1987. The report warned that "1987 may prove to be as bloody as 1982" in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.⁶⁸ On 9 December 1987, the recent uprising "began" when a Palestinian was shot by Israeli troops during a funeral for four Palestinians killed on 8 December 1987 by an Israeli truck driver who rammed their car at an army roadblock in Gaza.

Types of State Terror in the Occupied Territories

Acts of state terror became routine and widespread on a continuous basis during the Palestinian uprising which began in December 1987. The use of state terror in the recent period can be traced to the Spring 1982 policies of the

⁶⁷ Penny Johnson, "The Routine of Repression," MERIP, January-February, 1988, p. 4.

⁶⁸ The Link, 21/3, September, 1988, p. 9.

military government. Shootings and beatings were routine methods of responding to dissent, but the employment of such tactics was increased tremendously in the post-December 1987 period.

This section tests for acts of state terrorism perpetrated by the Israeli forces in the Occupied Territories. Evidence in this section is from human rights monitoring agencies and the acts discussed herein fit the categories of state terror listed on page 26. Different acts of state terror are often used together and are therefore inseparable. Acts such as shooting, beating with clubs, shooting tear gas in close quarters, sweeping raids on communities, mass arrests, and the denial of medical care frequently are acts which are inseparable in the sense that they often take place together. As an example, a person who has been wounded by gunshot might be denied medical care or subjected to harassment in the hospital. In addition, the use of collective punishments such as curfews cannot be separated from the impact of troops shooting tear gas into homes from which people cannot leave for fear of being shot for violating the curfew. Another example of the relationship between acts of state terror is that of arrest and prison conditions. Thus, there is an overlapping of the various acts of state terror which indicates the intensity of the violence. A person subjected to one form of state terror may experience a series of terrors.

A wide range of different terror acts are committed on a sustained basis by the military government in the Occupied Territories. Daoud Kuttab claims that in the first few months of the current uprising the Israeli authorities experimented with different methods of crushing the revolt--none of the measures taken was effective so a "comprehensive two pronged plan" was put into practice. The first part of the plan called for an "all out blitz against the entire Palestinian community" and the second a concentrated effort to break the political strength of Palestinian nationalists and especially the National Unified Command of the Uprising."⁶⁹ In order to accomplish these measures all communications in the territories were shut down. Links with the outside world were closed. This made it possible for the IDF to step up the use of state terror without having to be accountable to international opinion.⁷⁰ State terror is often perpetrated against people in an offensive manner simply to strike fear in the hearts and minds of a populace. In fact, military and security forces often initiate state terror operations.

On 3 April 1988, Defense Minister Rabin admitted many of the confrontations between the IDF and the Palestinians were initiated by the IDF. He specifically referred to an incident in Gaza:

⁶⁹ Middle East International, 2.April 1988, p. 3.

⁷⁰ New York Times, "Kissinger Urged Ban on TV Coverage of Violence," by Robert D. McFadden, 5 March 1988.

The incident here shows that in order to reach the goal (of restoring order) we are not just waiting for violence from the other side, but initiate actions and teach lessons to those who start violence. In the majority of incidents, the confrontations were the result of an initiative, (which was) partly an effort to ensure a calming of the situation and to suppress violence. (The Times, 4 April 1988)

Defense Minister Rabin stated, "If the Arabs do not keep quiet, they will find themselves standing on scorched earth."⁷¹ On 19 January 1988, Rabin gave orders to Israeli troops which authorized severe and random beatings, "The first priority is to use force, might, beatings."⁷² Rabin's orders ushered in a new era of increasingly severe physical attacks. The escalation of physical attacks, such as breaking bones with clubs, is designed to inflict on the victim a fear of the occupier. Two days after Rabin's statement, hospitals in Gaza reported 200 cases of broken bones. By January 27, 1,000 serious injuries had been reported. Injuries throughout the Occupied Territories were estimated at 2,000 during the period of 9 December 1987 to the end of January 1988.⁷³

American physicians visiting the Occupied Territories in February 1988 reported their estimate of total injuries at

⁷¹ In These Times, November 9-15, 1988, p. 11.

⁷² The Link, 21/3, September 1988, p. 9.

⁷³ Palestine Human Rights Information Center Report, (Chicago Office, Louise Cainkar, Contact Person, 17 February 1988) p. 3.

33,000 on the West Bank and 5,000 in Gaza. The Physicians for Human Rights Report of a Medical Fact Finding Mission determined that the pattern of injuries in Gaza and the West Bank differed in deliberate ways: changes back and forth from shootings with bullets to rubber bullets, to mass clubbings, to the use of gas culminated in different kinds of injuries over different time periods. It was determined that Gaza was subjected to attacks designed to produce permanent physical disabilities. The Physicians For Human Rights' February 1988 press conference revealed the attacks were focused on limbs and midshaft breaks indicating the limb was stretched out and "deliberately smashed to disable."⁷⁴ Dr. Geiger of the New York Medical School reported the delegations witnessed an "uncontrolled epidemic of violence by the army and police."⁷⁵ A journalist from Reuters reported that new baseball bat-sized clubs were issued to Israeli troops.⁷⁶

Evidence from the Physicians for Human Rights, Citizens Rights Movement, Al-Haq, and Israeli members of the Knesset (Sarid, Zucker) shows a significant number of injured to have been attacked not during demonstrations or clashes with troops, but rather attacked in or near their homes during raids: Dr. Leaning stated patients in Gaza hospitals, "look

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 9.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

⁷⁶ The Link, 21.3, September 1988, p. 9.

as if they have been mauled. What is impressive is the number of fractures per patient...They would have to hold them down and just keep beating them."⁷⁷ Leaning cites the nature of attacks as indicating a clear policy and not simply a lack of control:

That is one of the darker things we saw. These are not aberrations. It is a pattern that is controlled, a systematic pattern over a wide geographical area.⁷⁸

Approximately 38,000 people are estimated to have suffered physical attacks by Israeli troops. One physician described what he saw, "If this were a war, much of what we observed would be considered atrocities."⁷⁹ Ironically, On 9 February 1988, Defense Minister Rabin attributed the length of the Palestinian uprising to the "limits imposed on the use of force by Israel." Rabin denied that there was a policy of beatings, but acknowledged their occurrence during "hot pursuit" of demonstrators. Rabin pointed out that the use of clubbings by military and security forces is not unique to Israel but that, around the world, "When there is opposition by force, they do not kiss the demonstrators; they use clubs." In the one month period between 17 March and 19 April, 60 Palestinians were shot and killed by Israeli

⁷⁷ Palestine Human Rights Informan Center Report, op. cit.,
p. 5.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 4.

soldiers. In contrast, 82 were killed the previous 14 weeks. Shootings did not decrease and Rabin's orders to use beatings should be seen as supplementing not replacing gunfire.

The use of "rubber" bullets has not meant a reduction in serious injuries. One witness (Byron) to the use of rubber bullets contends that the soldiers simply aim for the head, eyes, or genitals in order to inflict damage. Rubber bullets were often used at close range during beatings with clubs. Jaws and vulnerable body parts were often injured in such a way. Byron also pointed out the weapons training undergone by Israeli troops is such that their marksmanship is quite good and they can easily aim to wound or to kill depending on their choice. This same witness reported the total number of deaths from all causes by August, 1988, was over 500; she notes only confirmed and documented deaths are reported by most media sources.⁸⁰ Middle East International reported that by the end of the first year of the uprising, 298 Palestinians were killed by shootings: 69 by tear gas, and 26 from injuries in physical attacks by Israeli troops.⁸¹ Clearly a majority of the deaths are due to shooting, but many more are wounded by gunfire. Al-Ittihad Hospital in Nablus treated

⁸⁰ Interview with Deborah Byron, Human Rights Observer, Eyewitness Israel Delegation, 3 August 1988, 1st Unitarian Church, San Diego, California.

⁸¹ Middle East International, December 16, 1988.

3,800 people for gunshot wounds during 1988.⁸² Although when contrasted to shootings, physical attacks have taken fewer lives, they have been the most widely experienced forms of state-terror. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency reported that their clinics in the Occupied Territories treated 6,000 people for injuries received from clubbings during 1988.⁸³

In the first week of the uprising (8 December-16 December) over 200 serious injuries were documented; eighty percent due to bullet wounds; over forty percent of the bullet wounds were to the head, chest or spinal column; 60% to the arms or legs. "Dumdum" bullets were introduced which explode on entry and cause excessive tissue damage and disabilities. Fifty percent of the injured during the first week were 18 years and younger, 10% were women. On 5 January 1988, troops greatly increased the use of clubbings which resulted in an increase in serious injuries.⁸⁴

On 10 January 1988, in Gaza, halftracks were driven through towns and refugee camps firing randomly; over seventy casualties were inflicted from the gunfire.⁸⁵

⁸² Palestine Human Rights Newsletter, Vol. 9, No. 1, January-February, 1989 (Chicago, IL: Palestine Human Rights Campaign) p. 3.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸⁴ Palestine Human Rights Information Center Report, op. cit., February 3, 1988, pp. 2-5.

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 2-5.

January 19, 1988, brought Rabin's publicly announced policy of physical attacks on randomly chosen people. One Israeli captain said, "You chase anybody you have to and beat him up, and altogether it works pretty well."⁸⁶ By mid-January the age range of victims was 4 to 70 years of age.⁸⁷ In Ramallah there is even a special wall in a vacant lot which is a central location for clubbings. Blood is stained on the wall.⁸⁸

Hospitals were special targets for the Shabak (Israeli security-intelligence service) and IDF troops. Palestinians quickly learned not to go to hospitals for treatment because the emergency rooms and patient rooms were subjected to troop raids armed with clubs and tear gas. Doctors were attacked and patient lists were confiscated for intelligence records. Ambulances were routinely prevented from entering sealed off areas undergoing raids or sweeping attacks by the IDF and security forces.⁸⁹

While deaths from shootings continued, there was a dramatic increase in deaths from the use of tear gas. Between January 12-17, seven people were killed by tear gas, five of whom were under one year of age. Tear gas was shot through

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 6.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. .

⁸⁸ The Link, 21/3, September 1988, p. 11.

⁸⁹ Palestine Human Rights Information Center Report, op. cit., p. 3.

windows into close quarters during times of curfews when people were forced to remain inside their homes for fear of being shot. Such acts caused 80 fetal deaths between 9 December and 20 February 1988. Many reports on the use of gas have the common theme of firing gas into homes after subjecting the residents to physical attacks:

Soldiers...threw tear gas canisters inside the old main house, which caused the suffocation of one year old infant girl and they went destroying the front entrances⁹⁰ of some houses with clubs and live bullets.

Gas was often dropped in large quantities from helicopters hovering over demonstrators. Strange types of gas have been fired at people. In an affidavit prepared by a Human Rights Delegation, it was recorded that a 15 year old girl was strangely affected by a red colored gas shot at her. She experienced lockjaw and tried to "rip open her chest." Periodic attacks still inflict her.

Shootings and the use of gas were acts accompanied by a long time policy of "collective" or "environmental" punishments which were intended to create hardships such that there would be a halt to the protests. Entire areas were sealed off and placed under total curfew without electricity, water or communications. Food supplies were denied, including

⁹⁰ For descriptions on the use of gas see: Palestine Human Rights Informan Center Reports, The Jerusalem Press: Daily Report from the Occupied Territories, Eyewitness Israel Report, December 1988, (American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee), Amnesty International Special Reports, The Link, and The Journal of Palestine Studies press reports.

UN supervised relief efforts. Food and relief supplies were publicly destroyed at roadblocks and checkpoints.

Violent attacks on Palestinian communities by Israeli settlers were (are) routine. Reports such as the following are common:

...settlers burst last night into Al-Eizarieh town east of Jerusalem and attacked residents.⁹¹

In October of 1988, an article by Yizhar Be'ev in Kol Ha'Ir exposed the existence of a death squad. In Yatta, two youths were abducted and killed in what was described by witnesses as a death squad operation.⁹²

Injuries experienced by Israelis as of February 10, 1988 were recorded by the IDF Information Department as 122 soldiers and border guards and 69 Israeli citizens injured.⁹³ Israeli troop strength during the uprising has been increased 5 times the normal size in the Gaza Strip and 3 times the normal on the West Bank. Between 50,000-100,000 Israeli troops are deployed in the Occupied Territories.⁹⁴ The

⁹¹ The Jerusalem Press: Daily Report from the Occupied Territories (Washington DC: Jerusalem Press Service, February 10, 1988)

⁹² Journal of Palestine Studies, Winter, 1989, p. 163.

⁹³ Jerusalem Press: Daily Report from the Occupied Territories, February 10, 1988.

⁹⁴ Palestine Human Rights Information Center Report, op. cit., January 24, 1988. The increase of troop strength was noticeable. Israel Shahak pointed out soldiers put stickers on their berets with "born to kill" and "blood" written in Hebrew. Regular forces are used more than reservists; reservists are older and less enthusiastic about attacking civilians. For estimated troop strength, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Lou Douglas Lecture Series,

magnitude of government violence in the Occupied Territories indicates the large number of people affected by the occupation. Since 1967, 300,000 Palestinians have been imprisoned in an Israeli jail--almost 20% of the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. The International Red Cross reported an even higher number of 500,000 arrests or detentions of Palestinians between 1967 and 1982. In 1976 alone, 33,000 Palestinians were detained in mass arrests, 8,000 of whom were charged. By 1987, an estimated 4,100 internal security prisoners were held in Israeli prisons. This does not include those held in any one of the 58 police stations. Conditions inside Israeli prisons are a form of terror.⁹⁵ The first report of torture by Israeli forces was published in 1968 by the International Committee of the Red Cross. The second major report came out in 1970 and was authored by Amnesty International. This report was followed in 1975 by evidence published by the U.S. Despite the long-time use of torture it was not until 1977 that the London Times of June 19, 1977 exposed the widespread torture of Palestinian prisoners so severe that many have been permanently debilitated, disfigured or driven insane. A

Kansas State University, April 18, 1989.

⁹⁵ For detailed evidence of torture, and general prison conditions see Mideast Monitor 5/1 (Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1988) p. 1-4. Amnesty International reports, London Times (June 19, 1977), International Committee of the Red Cross, Journal of Palestine Studies.

special military intelligence center of secret location called the Palace of Hell was noted for infamous tortures.

In 1977, the Israeli Landau Commission revealed that Shin Bet (Israeli intelligence) "routinely used physical pressure and lied about the methods used for obtaining confessions. This report, in effect, authorized such acts in the name of "preventing rampant terrorism." In 1980 it was revealed that a special prison was opened to house prisoners driven insane by interrogations. Prisoners Halawi and Jafairi were killed when, after a prolonged hunger strike, Israeli captors jammed force-feeding tubes down their throats, thus puncturing their lungs. For many Palestinians, the first prison experience has been identified as the catalyst for changing a young protestor or demonstrator into a determined fighter.⁹⁶ Punamaki studied the comparative use of torture in South America and by Israel and found beatings, cold water torture, sexual molestation and deprivations of food and water were more commonly experienced by Palestinian detainees than by South American political prisoners. The psychological trauma of torture was found to be the same in the two groups of victims. Prisoners have acquired heroic status and some Palestinians suggest that the precursor to the current Intifada happened in March, 1987, when 1,000 prisoners went on a hunger strike. This strike was

⁹⁶ Washington Post, January 3, 1988.

supported by large scale demonstrations throughout the Occupied Territories.

On 14 April 1988, Israel opened the third Ansar prison (Ansar III). Some 2,000-3,000 Palestinians were transferred to Ansar III where they live in tents with open sewers. From 5:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m., they are forced to work building the camp. The prisoners are subjected to beatings, spoiled food, physical and psychological torture.

Palestinians in the hands of Israeli forces have been subjected to harassment even by Israeli medical personnel. The Jerusalem Press Daily Report of 29 January 1988 states that after a 19 year old youth was shot in the leg and clubbed, he was deposited at an Israeli hospital whose administrator asked first for \$20,000 then \$3,000 for emergency surgery. After surgery, the patient was handcuffed and tied to the bed. Two Israeli guards watched over him, often threatening him when he complained.

Kidnappings by army troops are (were) committed during raids on communities. Youths would be clubbed then taken by car and dumped miles away from home.

Another way the Israelis inflict a state of fear in the population is to demolish houses by dynamite. By order of the military governor, any house can be demolished as "punishment," for security reasons, or because proper licenses for construction or rehabilitation are not held. Demolition of houses has long been a policy of state terror in the

Occupied Territories--1,500 houses were demolished between 1967 and 1987; 10,000 people were made homeless. The practice decreased in the 1977-1985 period under Likud when the emphasis was on co-opting Palestinians through various economic "quality of life" programs commensurate with attempts to create a non-nationalist Palestinian leadership. In 1985, upon the announcement of a more severe iron fist policy, the use of demolition was revived.⁹⁷

One particularly disturbing form of terror is vigilante violence. The Israeli settlers in the Occupied Territories are armed and allowed to play a security force role by the military government. In addition, there is overlapping membership between settlers and the military. Settlers serve in the reserve military units. Clashes between armed settlers and unarmed Palestinians are common occurrences; many times the settlers are on the offensive.

Jewish settlers were allowed by the IDF to rampage through several cities and towns during the first week of February, 1988. They attacked and burst into homes firing live bullets. Furniture, cars, water supplies, and food were destroyed. Youths were clubbed and kidnapped in what appeared to be well-organized attacks. Complicity of the military governor (General Mitzna) has been indicated.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ New York Times, June 9, 1987.

⁹⁸ Jerusalem Press, op. cit., February 9, 1988.

The complicity of Israeli military officers has been documented. The United National Relief and Works Agency Director for Gaza, Bernard Mills, stated:

I can't stay in Gaza much longer, the strain is too great. Because we work so intimately with the refugees, we know what's happening every night that the army raids a camp. I see the Israeli commander. I tell him what's taken place. He denies everything: 'No, these things are not happening. Our soldiers have orders not to abuse civilians. Any violation is a minor exception, a temporary lapse under some unusual provocation.'⁹⁹

Mills claimed that the most painful part for him is being lied to outright by Israeli officers. He also pointed out that, prior to December 9, 1987, Palestinians were routinely beaten and physically attacked mainly inside police stations; after December 9, the attacks were public and widespread. "Something has gone very, very fundamentally wrong here," said Mills.

The Children's Peace Campaign documents harm done to children by the Israeli authorities. Karen White has reported on the abuse of children and that she witnessed "severe beatings of unarmed children before and during the uprising." Her reports were delivered to the U.S. Ambassador and to the House subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East. Between

⁹⁹

Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (Washington, DC: American Education Trust, May, 1988) p. 16. AET is a nonprofit organization of retired Foreign Service Officers with Middle East experience. Bernard Mills, UNRWA Director for Gaza, expressed disgust that as a former army officer himself, he could not persuade Israeli officers to stop ordering attacks on innocent civilians.

December 9, 1987, and January 14, 1988, she reported 22 killed and 122 hospitalized for serious injuries.¹⁰⁰ Lt. Lior of the IDF stated, "They (the kids demonstrating) scamper like little mice, and if you catch one then it's a ball, you beat him for all the pleasure."¹⁰¹ An Israeli border guard admitted in June 1987 to beating up and permanently injuring a 7 year old boy as he left a mosque.

A Palestinian tour guide claims that: "Israel is trying to empty the West Bank of Palestinians."¹⁰² One organization, Al-Haq (Law in the Service of Man), monitors human rights violations and the process of creeping annexation. Displacement of the local population, administrative and collective punishments, secret judicial proceedings, 6 month renewable detentions without charges, "systematic" abuse of children, systematic torture are all aspects of living under Israeli occupation. Any Turkish, British, Jordanian or Israeli military decree of use for repression is selected and enforced by the IDF. The IDF has issued over 1,000 military decrees ranging from requiring a license to plant a tree or garden to the deportation of people without trial to Jordan or Lebanon. Decrees specify that any gathering of five or more people is illegal.

¹⁰⁰ American Friends Service Committee, op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁰¹ "Eyeless in Gaza," by Shulamith Hareven, New Outlook: Middle East Monthly, February, 1988, p. 18.

¹⁰² American Friends Service Committee, op. cit., p. 4.

Evidence indicates that the IDF, settlers and police are routinely on the offensive. The forces deployed are ordered to attack communities in nightraids leaving whole families injured and turning up at hospitals for treatment. Israeli soldiers confessed to such procedures and have made it clear they receive orders to commit acts of state-terror. Shamir explained the rioting in the occupied territories "was not a demonstration of civil disobedience but a war" waged not at the occupation but "against Israelis, against the existence of the State of Israel."¹⁰³ An Israeli soldier explained why even during curfews they lobbed tear gas canisters at homes and went into homes to beat up people: "In order to make our presence known in the camps during curfews we were given orders to knock on doors, enter inside and take men out. We were to separate and beat them, especially the young ones."¹⁰⁴ The idea is to re-establish the awe that the army had apparently lost, and to strike fear in the hearts of the Palestinians, as a senior Israeli source explained.

According to Member of the Knesset Dedi Zucker, IDF attacks on Palestinians are not a matter of an army simply losing control or running amok but an Army "that encourages, or even orders, the use of excessive force. Orders have been given to troops outside houses to go inside and break him (the

¹⁰³ The Link, op. cit., September, 1988, p. 12.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 12-13.

Palestinian) to pieces.'"¹⁰⁵ One military policeman testified, "The whole chain of command in the Israeli army told me, 'If you don't beat the person to the point he can't walk, you haven't done a thing.'" Another soldier testified, "Even if the local was not resisting arrest, we were to beat him in order to deter him from further stone-throwing, and if possible, to break legs."¹⁰⁶ This same soldier from the Givati Brigade pointed to Defense Minister Rabin's January 19, 1988, orders to employ beatings. Testimony by soldiers points to General Yitzhak Mordechai, commander of the IDF Southern Command as the originator of such orders.¹⁰⁷

UNRWA as of 25 June 1988 reported the following statistics of deaths: 0-20 years-44%; 20-30 yrs.-35%; 31-59 yrs.-12%; over 60 yrs.-9%. In the first 6 months of the uprising, 155 houses were demolished or sealed.

Defense Minister Rabin acknowledged that the army had used sharpshooters against demonstrators but said the goal was to "minimize casualties." Rabin defended the use of lethal force. An Israeli officer testified, "I also know one senior commander--I think he's a Kahanist--who walked around with a sniper. Shooting at the legs, all very precise,

¹⁰⁵ Christian Science Monitor, February 15, 1988, p. 4. Zucker reports that beatings put 300 Palestinians in the hospital each month.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

according to the law...We acted as if it were a built up area combat situation..."¹⁰⁸

The cycle of violence was initiated by the repressive atmosphere of the occupation. Evidence of offensive acts committed by the IDF indicates a pattern of initiating violence on orders from higher authority. An affidavit filed with a Human Rights delegation (Eyewitness Israel, 16 June-5 July 1988) shows the involvement of Israeli officers: a military officer instructed soldiers beating a 22 year old man: "Beat him till he dies." The victim was attached to the hood of a jeep and driven around the village.

Gaza and Balatta were the initial focal points of the 1987 uprising. Balatta was, according to one report, quiet until Israeli Border Guards went on a rampage for 3 days and nights as a means of teaching the populace a lesson.¹⁰⁹

Frank Collins, in Middle East International, asserts that Israeli policy has been designed to provoke the situation through the implementation of intensified repression under the August, 1985, Iron Fist Policy. The motives include tactical maneuverings of the military "mind;" encouraging unity against the Palestinian enemy; and to prepare the grounds for "getting rid of the Palestinians." While Meir Kahane calls on the army to expel the Palestinians, General Rehavam Zelevi and Michael

¹⁰⁸ New Outlook, February, 1988, p. 18.

¹⁰⁹ Middle East International, January 9, 1988.

Dekel, Deputy Minister of Defense, advocate an incremental policy of oppression and repression so that Palestinians will leave.¹¹⁰

In August, 1985, Brig. Gen. Yitzhak Mordechai, presently commander in Gaza, was acquitted of charges of violent behavior based on evidence (Israeli commission of inquiry) confirming the deaths of two Palestinians from skull fractures sustained during beatings while under his supervision. The two Palestinians were in his custody after their arrest for attempting to hijack a bus in Gaza (April, 1984).

The Eyewitness Israel Human Rights Delegation¹¹¹ has documented acts of state terror in the Occupied Territories and expressed specific concerns (statement July 5, 1988):

The conditions in the Occupied Territories are characterized by systematic brutality and dehumanizing practices against the Palestinians. The delegation was particularly disturbed by the Israeli violence perpetrated against children, the elderly, the disabled and the infirm.

The Eyewitness Israel Human Rights Delegation summary of state terror in the Occupied Territories includes a variety of different terrorizing methods. The "Eyewitness Israel" delegation collected testimony and affidavits which summarized the following acts which fit into the definition of state-terror. In most cases, their evidence is further substantiated by Amnesty International Reports.

¹¹⁰ Middle East International, February 6, 1988.

¹¹¹ Eyewitness Israel delegate report, 3 August 1988.

1. Beatings: carried out routinely with clubs, and often without provocation. Findings indicate a pattern of injuries systematically inflicted. These injuries include broken limbs and multiple fractures. Beatings sometimes result in death. Children and young men are particular targets.
2. Shootings: indiscriminate and at close range. Ammunition includes rubber bullets (metal slugs with rubber covering) and high velocity bullets.
3. Gas used extensively. It is frequently fired into enclosed areas including hospitals, schools, mosques, homes. This often results in severe injuries, miscarriages, and death. Gas canisters are also intentionally fired directly at persons.
4. Demolition of houses as a form of collective punishment.
5. Collective punishments such as curfews, school closings, demolition of houses, mass beatings, house arrest and town arrest.
6. Closures, curfews and restrictions on movement imposed on entire villages and camps accompanied by the denial of food, water, electricity, and communication. The terror here pertains to the psychological anxiety and physical hardship induced under such restrictions.
7. Confiscation of property including personal belongings, food, harvests, farm equipment, money and valuables. The invasion of privacy and consequent dispossession of belongings and equipment needed as means of support induces a state of fear.
8. Injections administered by soldiers. Unknown green or clear substances forcibly injected into the arms, legs, neck, and spinal area. Israeli security forces have carried "black boxes" with syringes, substances, and small hatchets or hammers. The victim is forced to make a choice of which punishment he prefers.
9. Abductions of people including children to distant places or hostile areas at night and abandoning them.
10. Denial of medical assistance including the obstruction of ambulances, attacks on medical

personnel, denial of licenses to clinics, hospitals, ambulances.

11. Administrative detentions for up to six months without charge, renewable every six months. Families are frequently not notified.
12. Confiscation of identify cards as a means of collecting revenue. Coded identity cards are used in conjunction with computer data banks. Anyone without a proper identity card risks imprisonment.
13. Prison conditions made particularly harsh as a means of inducing fear in the society. Prisoners are often denied food, water, toilets, showers and suffer from overcrowding. Food is often spoiled. Prisoners in addition to facing psychological and physical torture frequently are forcibly subjected to sitting in the desert heat and sun or the extreme cold. One prison has been identified as the "Bambi" prison for the imprisonment and interrogation of children ages six to twelve. The infamous Ansar I, II, and III prisons are well-known for horrific conditions. It has been reported that military doctors routinely stitch up prisoners without anesthesia.
14. Torture includes electric shock, testicle clamps, stabbing with hypodermic needles in the testicles, confinement to wooden box "cupboards" standing in cold water.
15. Sweeping military raids on communities wherein soldiers break into homes, smash furniture, belongings, defecation or urination in rooms of people's houses, and stealing belongings.
16. Humiliation by forcing people to sing, insult each other, jump, insult the PLO, etc.
17. Deportations of people suspected of supporting nationalism.

These findings further substantiate the claim that a variety of different forms of state terror are commonly experienced by the Palestinian population. It should be emphasized that state terror acts, as indicated by the remarks

of Israeli soldiers, are intended to create a state of fear such that the populace will resign themselves to permanent Israeli control over the territories. The use of state terror is an effort to make revolt so expensive in human costs that the populace simply gives up their struggle.

Summary of Case Study Findings for Israel and the Occupied Territories

The following chart summarizes the case study findings for Israel and the Occupied Territories:

	<u>Political Zionism</u>
1. The state is devoted to the security of the in-group?	Yes
2. The state acquires land resources for the exclusive use of the in-group?	Yes
3. The state governs over people who are not granted full and equal citizenship rights?	Yes

Acts of State Terror perpetrated by Israeli forces in the Occupied Territories:

1. Beatings/Physical Attacks.	Yes
2. Shootings to injure or kill.	Yes
3. The offensive use of gas.	Yes
4. Denial of medical care for the wounded.	Yes
5. Sweeping raids.	Yes
6. Detention without limit or trial.	Yes

- | | | |
|-----|---|-----|
| 7. | Prison conditions/
torture. | Yes |
| 8. | Kidnappings and
abductions. | Yes |
| 9. | Vigilante violence. | Yes |
| 10. | Demolition of houses
as a collective
punishment. | Yes |
| 11. | Collective punishments
such as curfews. | Yes |
| 12. | Deportations, forced
removals or transfers
of people. | Yes |

CHAPTER III

SOUTH AFRICA

Ideology

In order to evaluate the role ideology plays in defining state security it is necessary to examine the security prescriptions called for by South Africa's apartheid ideology. By examining such prescriptions derived from apartheid, it is possible to discover what constitutes state security under the apartheid system.

Apartheid is the guiding ideology in South Africa. According to apartheid ideology, the state must remain under the exclusive control of the white population; otherwise the white population will be insecure. As such, apartheid structures the socio-economic and political relations of South African society along racial lines. Apartheid as a term was first used by the National Party in 1948 when it introduced it as a comprehensive program for society. Apartheid is an Afrikaaner word which translates into separateness in English. The National Party, the dominant political force in South African parliamentary politics since 1948, has over the years been successful in translating the ideology of apartheid into practice. Apartheid ideology is translated into policy through the coercive powers of the state. Apartheid is an ideology designed to protect the dominant status of the white minority (4.8 million), who rule a country of 24 million Africans, 890,000 Indians, and 2.8 million "coloreds." In

order to maintain white domination, the South African regime has set aside reserves or Bantustans for 13 million Africans; in this way, whites are able to express their version of nationalism in dominant terms on 87% of territorial South Africa while Africans are forced into the Bantustans comprising 13 percent of the territory. It is important to note that the basic foundations for apartheid existed prior to 1948. Racial segregation had long been present in South African society before 1948.¹ Today, Africans can be granted South African "citizenship," but this does not grant them legal or political rights. Apartheid focuses on denying racially integrated nationalism and instead enforces racial separation as a means of securing the dominant position of white nationalism in South Africa. Thus, apartheid is made up of a series of subsystems based on race to which each member of society is assigned. One system, that of the whites, is dominant over the various subsystems. Thus, Africans are the out-group.

Domination has two aspects according to Heribert Adam. One is the objective functional and the other is the

¹ Roger Omond, The Apartheid Handbook (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986) p. 15. Omond contends that racial discrimination became institutionalized in 1910-1913 about the time of the rise of Afrikaaner political power. The 1913 Natives Land Act is cited as an early example. The Act of Union (1910) allowed each of four provinces (states) to establish their own racial laws. In the Cape and Natal, a few select blacks could vote; such was not the case in Transvaal and the Orange Free State where Afrikaners dominated. The African National Congress (1912) was a direct reaction to discriminatory disenfranchisement.

subjective one of how it impacts on those who are dominated. This study looks at both the functional role of apartheid and the way it treats people. Apartheid serves the functional role of ensuring white domination which in the apartheid advocates nund is synonomous with the security of the white population. Apartheid is, in effect, ethnocentric nationalism. Whereas classical definitions of political nationalism allow participation for all people, apartheid does not; it remains solely an expression of Afrikaaner and "white" nationalism. Self-determination applies only to the whites. So-called "utopian" apartheid recognizes the right of Africans to have "self-rule" only through the political structures of their respective tribes on territory allotted to them by the South African regime.

Some analysts of the South African political scene have suggested the inevitable failure of the Bantustan policy. The maintenance of security amidst a series of statelets packed with alienated African workers is thought by some to be virtually impossible. The Bantustans could become launching grounds for anti-apartheid operations. The basic concept of the Bantustan policy seeks to accomplish the following: (1) geographical segregation of as many Africans as possible from non-Africans and of specific African ethnic groups from each other; (2) Pretoria- sponsored cultural relativism, and the elaboration of pseudo-traditional authority structures; (3) an extension of the sphere of local

autonomy under the authority of government-appointed chiefs, which in effect, amounts to a shift from "direct" to "indirect" rule. Africans under the apartheid system and the Bantustan policy are denied the right to nationalism.² Afrikaaner ideology is an exclusive and racist type of thought which seeks to establish security for its people through asymmetrical political relations with other peoples. The functional role of apartheid includes not only its practical structuring of society along racial lines, but also its historical role in unifying and empowering the white Afrikaaners. The myths of apartheid provide the whites with a tribal lore of their own while at the same time justifying their racist worldview.

Apartheid is an ideology containing a great deal of mythology, according to Leonard Thompson. Thompson discusses political mythologies in the following terms:

By a political myth, I mean a tale told about the past to legitimize or discredit a regime; and by political mythology, a cluster of such myths that reinforce one another and jointly constitute the historical element in the ideology of the regime or its rival.³

Thompson points out that political mythology could be, in an ideal world, strongly democratic, scientifically valid and

² Pierre L. van den Berghe, "Racial Segregation in South Africa: Degrees and Kinds," Race and Politics in South Africa, edited by Ian Robertson and Phillip Whitten (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978) p. 4.

³ Leonard Thompson, The Political Mythology of Apartheid (New Have: Yale University Press, 1985) p. 1.

beneficial to society. Unfortunately few political mythologies are of such a nature.

Thompson's analysis of apartheid traces its role in history as providing the Afrikaners with a religious based mythology of a persecuted but "Chosen" people devoted to spreading Christian civilization and Calvinist economic development. Apartheid is an ideology with explicit racist-religious rhetoric maintaining that blacks are descendants of Ham, cursed to be "hewers of wood and drawers of water." God ordained whites to be masters and rulers according to the Afrikaner theologians. Apartheid ideology is manichean in that those deemed less civilized are the nonelect. These myths were vitally important to the mobilization stage of Afrikanerdom when the building of nationalism required commitment against the British and the indigenous African population. With the ascendancy of Afrikaner political and economic might Afrikaner nationalism in the form of apartheid ideology became the dominant force for the structuring of South African society.

Lambley traces the Afrikaner ascendancy in South Africa and the concomitant decline of the British. The process of developing Afrikaner nationalism led to the establishment of a "state within a state" by 1910 and the consolidation of Afrikaner dominance in 1948. Lambley's study of Afrikaner society shows the anti-British attitudes of Afrikaners, and the racism towards blacks. Lambley contends the political

structures of the South African state to be feudalistic. The decision-making elite in South Africa is based on the Broederbond, a relatively small, secret, and closed society of top Afrikaanders dedicated to the security of white nationalism--through the maintenance of apartheid.

The ideology of apartheid which is comprehensive in its structuring of the political, economic and social relations in society, depends on myths such as racism, neo-Calvinism, and territorial rights. The South African regime sees itself fighting a defensive war from within the "laager".⁴ The "laager mentality" or paradigm is evident in the expressions of the South African leadership. The myth of a gallant, heroic, chosen people fighting against the evils of barbarism and atheism is ever present in the utterances of the South African leadership.⁵ Thompson maintains that it is the responsibility of intellectuals to cut through and expose the mythologies which guide the operative behaviors of people.

Bishop Desmond Tutu focuses on the ideology of apartheid as the basis for the crisis in South Africa:

Any student of the South African situation who is worth his salt will point out that our trouble really stems from apartheid, this sociopolitical

⁴ Laager is the Afrikaander term used to describe the circling of pioneer wagons in hostile areas to enable defense. The concept is very similar to the Euro-american pioneers who circled their wagons at night and during attack as a tactic. Today the term implies being obsessed with security, of being surrounded by enemies.

⁵ Thompson, op. cit., pp. 144-145. The importance of the laager is expressed by Andries Treurnicht.

and economic dispensation which makes no pretense of being democratic.⁶

Bishop Tutu's analysis of apartheid ideology concludes that it makes little long term sense, hence it relies on a desperate authoritarianism. Such a system has to be maintained through an elaborate police state infrastructure.

Bishop Desmond Tutu described the South African government's security concerns:

And so there is an obsession with law and order, and tough measures leading to the arrest of children as young as seven years old, and to the detention of an eleven year old boy for weeks at a time. When people get obstreperous just knock them one in the head and you will have sorted them out properly!...Repressive measures seem to deal with disorder in an efficient way that brooks no nonsense, and is often attractive to those who fear the invigorating uncertainties that occur when different points of view are vying for the patronage of the public.⁷

Bishop Tutu points out that repressive measures deal with symptoms of "the malaise of the body politics" such that repression leads to a "superficial calm." Cycles of uprisings and repression have long been a part of the South African political scene--Sharpeville 1960, Soweto 1976 and 1985.

The South African state claims it is being subjected to a "total onslaught" and is at war with subversion. The state leadership, Botha in particular, asserts that reforms will incrementally take place, but as of yet, there is no

⁶ Mark A. Uhlig, "The Coming Battle for South Africa," Apartheid in Crisis (New York: Vintage Books, 1986) p. 18.

⁷ Ibid., p. 16.

comprehensive reform program which would dismantle the structures of apartheid society. President Botha's successor to be, F. W. de Klerk, strongly supports the maintenance of white security (dominance) through apartheid.

South Africa has been characterized as a garrison state in the process of fighting a war to preserve the apartheid system.⁸ Many writers emphasize the economic aspects of the apartheid structure and the tremendous privileges the system provides for the 4.8 million whites. H.F. Dickie-Clark contends that both material and ideal explanations play a part in the explanation of apartheid.⁹ The two variables should not be separated. Apartheid as an ideology has economic as well as security prescriptions; the two are integrally related for apartheid structures economic inequality based on race. Advocates of apartheid use a combination of economic, political, religious, social, and racial arguments. Ultimately their argument is based on security grounds.

Apartheid ideology, as stated earlier is concerned with the security of white economic, political and social supremacy. In the Apartheid mind, for whites to be secure in

⁸ Gavin Cawthra, Brutal Force: The Apartheid War Machines (London: International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1986)

⁹ Hamish F. Dickie-Clark, "Ideology in Recent Writings on South Africa," South Africa: The Limits of Reform, edited by Heribert Adam (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1983) p. 111. Ideology according to Dickie-Clark is the interplay between material and ideal factors.

their privileges, separation of the races must be enforced. The economic privileges enjoyed by the white population must be maintained by holding onto the most productive land and controlling the industries. The remainder of the country, some 13% of the land, is assigned to the African population in the form of dependent "statelets." The Group Areas Act of 1950 is an elaborate scheme used for assigning particular "racial" groups to specific territories and areas. Populations of people are shuffled and shifted around South Africa to suit the economic and security requirements of the state. Since separation of the races is a key pillar of apartheid, "different" people should be assigned to different areas. A democratic challenge to apartheid is, in light of demographic realities, a challenge to the economic, political and social privileges enjoyed by the white citizens. The system boundaries established by apartheid define security. If the boundaries of apartheid are breached, state security is threatened.

In the face of serious internal and external challenges to the apartheid establishment, two strains of apartheid are advocated, one which advocates a slight re-structuring of apartheid to allow for the development of a black middle class, and the other which stands for no compromise on the principles of apartheid. The latter prescription, advocated by the conservative movement, has recently made some electoral gains by challenging the National Party leadership as too

"soft." The conservative wing of apartheid stands for no concessions to the black population, however superficial they may be. The former group led by Botha consists of the business and military elite who argue that apartheid can be relaxed and restructured in such a way that the overall apartheid system can be preserved.¹⁰ In order to accomplish this objective, they call for a sophisticated counterinsurgency doctrine combining intensified repression with limited modifications of apartheid laws. This is promoted by the new modernist technocratic officers, the "enlightened" politicians, and the business elite. The "enlightened" apartheid promoters support the removal of blatantly discriminatory laws; most of these pertain to the use of public facilities and the legal restrictions on employment.

Under Botha's leadership, the verligte ("enlightened") wing of apartheid has held the upper position. The conservative verkramptes ("narrow-minded") wing of apartheid has had less political power.

State Security Policies

A State of Emergency was declared in South Africa in March, 1960 for the first time in the face of growing rejection of the apartheid system. Government repression had existed through the elaborate apartheid laws enforced by the

¹⁰ Cawthra, op. cit., p. 26.

security services. Opposition forces delayed the use of violence until the post- Sharpeville era (1960). Sixty-nine peaceful black protestors had been shot at a demonstration in Sharpeville (1960) against the Pass Laws. Their deaths triggered additional protests which were followed by the declaration of a State of Emergency.¹¹ During the 1960's, government repression contained the opposition to apartheid and was largely successfully in maintaining the regime's definition of security.

In 1974, the collapse of the Portuguese empire gave encouragement to the anti-apartheid struggle and placed the apartheid regime in a precarious position. The "communist" menace was, in the eyes of the apartheid establishment, now on their very borders. The "onslaught" had begun. The war in Rhodesia was escalating and the efficacy of black nationalism was proving itself. Internally South Africa experienced strikes and limited sabotage from 1960-1976.

On 16 June 1976, in Soweto, peaceful student protests against the inferior African educational system and the imposition of the Afrikaaner language, were met with gunfire. Within a week two hundred people had been killed. During the Fall of 1976, riots and demonstrations were common in all four provinces and the Bantustans. The incidents were for the

¹¹ Stephan W. Davis, Apartheid's Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987) p. 26.

most part spontaneous. After Soweto, the regime stepped up its counterinsurgency policies. Although the uprisings of 1976-1977 had been put down it became increasingly clear in the regime's perspective that military forces would need to be deployed to maintain security. Resistance to the apartheid system was manifested by the increasing number of school boycotts, strikes, worker stayaways, attacks on police, demonstrations, and rent strikes.

The South African Defense Force was deployed in large numbers in the townships during 1978. Areas were sealed off and sweeping military raids on black communities became common. In 1981, a State of Alert was declared. During these years, 1978-1985, evidence indicates that the security forces were clearly on the offensive as part of the counterinsurgency strategy (Total Strategy).¹² At the same time, the regime tried to implement policies designed to create a non-threatening non-nationalist black leadership. When it became obvious that these policies were doomed to failure, the level of repression was increased.

To maintain state security, "the National Security Doctrine" was developed from within the Cold War context of the 1950's and 1960's. The basic belief is that South Africa is confronting a "total onslaught" of communism which is defined in the broadest possible terms. The conflict in South

¹² Ibid., pp. 242-250.

Africa has been framed in terms of a struggle against the evils of Marxism. The apartheid establishment sees itself as perhaps the only real fighter against the onslaught of Soviet strategic designs. Critics of the apartheid regime are defined as either conscious or unwitting supporters of international communism. The National Security Doctrine specified a "total response" on the part of South Africa's Defense Forces. This state security doctrine was the outgrowth of the Potgieter Commission of Inquiry which established the foundation for a centralized intelligence agency (BOSS). The Bureau of State Security was in place by 1969. In 1972, a State Security Council was established to manage all the aspects of regime security.¹³ During the early 1970's, there was a bureaucratic struggle between the police and BOSS versus the more sophisticated ("enlightened") circles of the military, intelligence, and security establishment. The latter won new influence under Botha.

Botha's friend and close advisor, General Magnus Malan (Chief of South African Defense Force, SADF), veteran of the Algerian war (1960's) and former student at the US Army Command and General Staff College is a student of counterinsurgency warfare who is well aware of the social and

¹³ Cawthra, op. cit., p. 27. Cawthra provides a detailed description of the rapid growth of the internal security establishment in South Africa. He describes the notion in the South African military that opposition to apartheid is synonymous with communism. Such notions were developed during the 1950's.

political aspects of such wars. He played a critical role in authoring South Africa's approach to internal security. The counter-revolutionary theories of Andre Beufre are popular at the SADF Joint Defense College. Beufre places particular emphasis on the psychological aspects of warfare. Major General G. L. Meiring of the SADF said in 1985, the use of McCuen's The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War was prominent as a guide to the principles of counterinsurgency at the SADF Joint Defense College.¹⁴

South African military and security officials authored a doctrine calculated to deal with the increasing resistance to apartheid. This doctrine was a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy called the "Total Strategy."

"Total Strategy" was in place by March of 1977 and specified the East/West conflict as central to the situation in South Africa. Total Strategy, furthermore, defined South African security in terms of a broad,

national strategy to ensure the survival of a society in which the principle of the right to self-determination of the White nation must not be regarded as being negotiable.¹⁵

The doctrine of "Total Strategy" is all encompassing:

Coordination between government departments is of the utmost importance. There are few if any government departments which are not concerned with one or the other aspect of national security, or

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 26-40, where one finds extensive discussion of the personalities and institutions of the South African state security system. McCuen was a US Army Lt. Colonel.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 29.

which do not contribute to the realization of national security.¹⁶

Total Strategy defined almost all sectors of society as coming under the rubric of South African Defense Force concerns:

Political action; military/para military action; economic action; psychological action; scientific and technological action; religious cultural action; manpower services; intelligence services; security services; national supplies, resources and production services; transport and distribution services; financial services; community services; telecommunication services.¹⁷

State security, as of the 1977 Defense White Paper, entered intrusively into all sectors of society. Thus, the "national security state" was in place. Prime Minister Botha, elected in September 1978, had acquired an indepth knowledge of the Total Strategy doctrine from his tenure as Defense Minister (1966-1980). Botha's expressed goal was to ensure the survival of the apartheid system into the twenty-first century. South Africa's strategy for survival entails (1) internal political control through apartheid; (2) economic growth; (3) the establishment of powerful military and security systems and (4) a foreign policy strategy designed to improve relations with surrounding African states. The latter policy is calculated to coerce the frontline states

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 30.

into accepting the South African regime.¹⁸ A secret and rather sophisticated "National Security Management System" was established in 1980. Its mandate extended to all sectors of society specified by the Total Strategy doctrine outlined above. The State Security Council, whose membership is not fully known, is the executive body of the National Security Management System which coordinates all activities pertaining to state security.

The South African regime is characterized as having two faces; one which is the civil facade of parliamentary government and the other the State Security Council where real power is located.¹⁹ Much of the credit for this national security system goes to P. W. Botha, one time Defense Minister, Prime Minister and after government reorganization in 1984, State President. General Malan, one of Botha's closest associates, helped author the present day Total Strategy policies. South African strategists such as Brigadier Roos see the conflict as 20% military and 80% political -- this approach is based on the ideas of counterinsurgency experts such as Trinquier. The political aspect of the counter-insurgency war is fought by the Civic

¹⁸ Ian Robertson and Colin Legum, Ibid., pp. 165-166.

¹⁹ Michael Evans and Mark Phillips, "Intensifying Civil War: The Role of the South African Defense Force," State, Resistance and Change in South Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1988) pp. 117-145. Evans and Phillips suggest the power of the security and military forces is such that a shadow government exists composed of state security officials.

Action branch of the SADF. Civic Action teams include school teachers in Soweto, medical teams for the homelands (Bantustans) as well as maintaining roadblocks during SADF sweeps on specific townships. General Malan asserted,

Militarily we can win the war. We can win it tomorrow. But this is the type of battle you never win on the military field. You win it in the political field.²⁰

Grundy, an expert on the SADF, wonders how the South African regime can possibly win the political battle by enforcing a system that denies the rights of 70% of the population to participate in the national political process.

Grundy traces the rapid development since 1979 of a state security system with highly centralized control located in the SSC (State Security Council) and the President's Office. South Africa is an "executive state" with primary emphasis on security matters as they relate to all sectors of society.

The security establishment is central to any analysis of the South African state. The South African Defense Force has been transformed from a small border defense force dedicated to territorial integrity to one primarily concerned with counter-insurgency and internal security. Prior to 1948, the UDF (Union Defense Force) was organized along British lines and had no role in domestic politics. With the National Party victory in 1948, a process of Afrikaanerization was applied

²⁰ Kenneth W. Grundy, The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986) p. 27.

to the military. The SADF underwent a gradual transformation towards that of an ideological military. By the 1960's and 1970's the SADF was the frontline defense of the apartheid regime.²¹

In order to construct a state obsessed with white security, an elaborate ideological socialization process is present in South African society. White South Africans have been militarized through the educational and media systems. The SADF is portrayed and romanticized as a "People's Army." Evidence clearly shows the SADF as an instrument of the ruling National Party. The political indoctrination of troops "contains a measure of pro-NP publicity...and an unflinching advocacy of racial separation."²² The ideological impact of apartheid and its prescriptions to insure white security are mostly strongly evident in the Citizen Force and Commando units, both of which are zealously committed to upholding the apartheid system. These units are part-time territorial units responsible for rural and urban area defense. They are "volkish" and possess the Afrikaaner values of the Bible and the gun. In South Africa, there is a militarization of civilian life and a politicization of the military. Whites entrust their future to military power.²³

²¹ Ibid., pp. 7-8.

²² Ibid., p. 110.

²³ Ibid., p. 70.

Grundy concludes that the security establishment in South Africa is committed to an informal master plan authored by the verligte ("enlightened") wing of the National Party elite, dedicated to the continuation of the white dominant society. In order to maintain white domination, it is necessary to have a volksleer or people's army for the white nation. The security establishment led by the President and SSC do not debate ends, for these are already assumed and are inherent in apartheid ideology. They debate tactics and strategies. According to Grundy's analysis regarding the security elite:

All at the top are committed to the maintenance of the class/race based system. In this regard the best form of conservatism is seen by some as a managed liberalism.²⁴

The security establishment is an inevitable outgrowth of the apartheid ideological system which is exclusively dedicated to the security and privilege of whites. The exclusive nature of apartheid ideology means that security is viewed as a zero-sum game. Afrikaaner nationalism must prevail and dominate South African Society. As Magubane points out:

Apartheid...is more than a mere racial discrimination or casual exploitation of one group by another. It is a strict ideology of white supremacy, racial oppression, and exploitation, whose logical extremity--genocide --is tempered by the need for African labor. "If only there were

²⁴ Ibid., p. 112.

some way," runs the white person's dream,²⁵ "of having them here and yet not having them here."

In order to maintain white supremacy, a state of fear must be induced in those groups and individuals who are potential and active challengers to the regime. Historically, the potential challengers could not be exterminated because of their labor value. On the other hand, they could not be admitted to the political process because of their numbers. Once the potential challengers began to actively rebel, the security of the apartheid state required the use of ever increasingly repressive measures.

Part of the counterinsurgency strategy of the apartheid regime has been to create an alternative non-nationalist black leadership which would accept the structures enforced by the state. This leadership ideally would derive its legitimacy from tribal foundations or through a constituency accepting of apartheid. These encouragements by the government have failed. Therefore the government, according to Moleah, "...has nowhere else to turn. Beyond repression and violence it has nowhere."²⁶

²⁵ Bernard Makhosezwe Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979) p. 250.

²⁶ Alfred T. Moleah, "South Africa Under Siege: The Ever-deepening Crisis of Apartheid," Without Prejudice: The EAFORD International Review of Racial Discrimination, 1/1 (Fall, 1987) p. 83.

The South African regime offers no future program, except minor adjustments in the superficial and overtly crude aspects of apartheid; apartheid faces a majority population committed to the overthrow of its main premise of white supremacy. The apartheid regime can only respond with military action and state violence.

The South African Government's Surplus People Project Report of 1983 estimated 3,522,900 people had been removed from one place and relocated to another between 1960 and 1983. In 1986, 1.8 million people were slated by government orders for removal. Only 2,262 white families were removed between 1951 and 1981. The process of removing whites from one area to another is entirely different from that of blacks. Removals have been carried out for a variety of reasons ranging from urban development schemes to military and security requirements. The Transvaal Province is most noted of the four provinces for removals--1,295,400 people have been removed and another 605,000 are under the threat of removal. The process for removal begins with the communication of government orders to community leaders followed by the use of force if such orders and deadlines are resisted.

Denemark and Lehman, writing in 1984, contend that the South African regime has maintained itself through the use of political repression and state terror. In order to put the apartheid ideological system into practice, state repression must be used. State-terror is viewed as an escalation in the

level and types of government violence. Denemark and Lehman claim that a clear distinction between repression and state terror is difficult. Terror is more direct and includes the use of military and police attacks, raids; the security laws which arbitrarily deny rights; and the forced relocations of large numbers of people. It is estimated that 6.0 millions Africans have been moved as a result of the Bantustan policy.

Denemark concludes that state terror emanates from conditions peculiar to the state. The state is maintained through an expensive policy of terror. Johnstone characterizes the South African situation as essentially a Human Rights struggle:

This ongoing repression of human rights struggles is thus another important dimension of the human rights problem in South Africa. As a systematic violation of human rights, apartheid has generated an intensifying dialectic of resistance and repression, in which human rights have been even further²⁷ abused by direct and indirect forms of state terror.

Johnstone traces the latest round of repression to 1984 and asserts that the increase is largely due to the lack of success in co-opting the black population into accepting the apartheid system.

Types of State Terror in South Africa

The following is a description of specific types of state terror used in South Africa. There is a difference in the

²⁷ Frederick Johnstone, "South Africa," International Handbook of Human Rights, edited by Jack Donnelly and Rhoda E. Howard (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987) p. 350.

quality and quantity of information on South African and Israeli human rights abuses. There is a great deal more in the way of detailed material on Israeli state terror. The information and documents from Palestinian, Israeli and UN Human Rights sources are much better in documenting the experiences of individual victims and specific Israeli operations. Such detailed and extensive information for South Africa was not available to this researcher. Nevertheless, it was possible to test for the acts of state terror.

Shootings are evidently one of the most common responses of the security forces. Evidence indicates that SADF and police forces do not shoot only in self-defense, but rather initiate offensive action. An example of such an incident occurred on 21 March 1985 on the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre (1960). The police opened fire on a funeral procession near Uitenhage. Twenty people, including children, were killed and many others wounded. The police were equipped with lethal ammunition and firearms instead of the usual riot gear on orders of the police commanders. Fifteen of the twenty killed were shot in the back.²⁸ Amnesty International has expressed strong concern about the systematic, deliberate policy of using lethal force on demonstrators. The South African regime has granted full

²⁸ Amnesty International, South Africa Briefing (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1986) p. 1. This report contains information on the types of state terror used and the casualties.

immunity to law enforcement personnel as a part of the State of Emergency.

The escalation of state-terror by shooting was particularly evident between September, 1984, and late November, 1985, during which 800 people were killed, most of whom were shot by police.

The SADF and police forces carry out large-scale "pacification" operations by sealing off areas followed by sweeping raids wherein houses are systematically searched. Students are often subjected to whippings and beatings by the SADF and police. Night curfews are imposed on townships. Propaganda messages and leaflets are dropped from armored cars and helicopters. Part of the psychological warfare strategy has even included distributing toy armored cars to children in areas terrorized by their presence.²⁹ Widespread attacks on communities and individuals have been documented:

All over the country, township residents reported widespread and often indiscriminate brutality by the regime's forces, including beatings, tortures, assaults, rapes, abductions, attacks on children and interference with injured people. Press reports and affidavits drawn up by victims reveal a pattern of police and army brutality which was repeated over and over in townships across the country.³⁰

Water canons, tear gas, rubber bullets, shotguns, whips and batons have been widely used by the police and SADF. Reports charge the SADF of driving through townships in

²⁹ Cawthra, op. cit., pp. 251-252.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 252.

armored vehicles firing indiscriminately at houses and people even when no protest, demonstration or political activity of any kind was taking place. Children have been beaten publicly as a lesson to others. Incidents have been reported where the police and/or SADF lured a crowd into ambushes, where they were trapped and subjected to gunfire. One SADF soldier reported the following:

We come up on a pick-up truck loaded with children and youths who show us the clenched fist. The cops go into action. The pick-up is overtaken and forced to stop. Black bodies spill off in all directions as the cops tumble out in pursuit. Soon, they return with their catch: a boy of about 10 whom they hit and slap as they drag him into the vehicle where they continue to slap and punch...We trundle on...There is a loud dong as a stone hits the armor and bounces in through the roof opening. The sergeant acts immediately, sending off a 37 mm gas canister. It lands on a house and the residents pour out coughing eyes streaming. We go and watch briefly, the cops laugh loudly... The funeral is over. The returning crowd starts to break up. Knots of people on the street corners sign and shout defiance...We launch into a hurtling, lurching circuit, past streams of panicking, running people, pumping out gas and rubber bullets. It's over in a couple of minutes. The cops prepare for the second round but the crowd has dispersed. There is an atmosphere of sport. Eventually we return to the police station. The police have brought in a man (ostensibly a stonethrower) and derive much sport from beating him and poking him with the sjamboks and truncheons³¹ in front of the station and in the back of a van...

Evidence also shows a pattern of police commanders not issuing available riot equipment and purposely encouraging

³¹ Ibid., pp. 253-254.

the use of rifles.³² Automatic weapons which fire rubber bullets in continuous streams have been used in addition to automatic tear gas guns which do the same. The South African Police journal, Servamus, suggested that European riot control methods are ineffective and impractical, and that only severe methods are efficacious. Riots are considered part of the "total communist onslaught" and thus are treated as combat situations. From July, 1985, to March, 1986, between 800-1,000 people were killed (200 children), many more wounded and 8,000 detained.

The legal bases for government repression in South Africa are extensive and are beyond the scope of this research. A whole series of laws are used to enforce the apartheid system and counter opposition to the regime. The Public Safety Act of 1953 empowers the State President with the right to declare State of Emergency rule. The whole of South Africa has been under State of Emergency rule since June, 1986. The Internal Security Act of 1982 makes indefinite detention without charges or trial legal. Each State of Emergency declaration has widened the police powers of the state. United Democratic Front leaders theorize that the State of Emergency is partly used as a "legal" cover for the encouragement of state-sponsored violence by vigilante groups.³³ Vigilante groups

³² Ibid., pp. 254.

³³ African Research Bulletin, May 15, 1987. p. 8891.

include white and black death squads encouraged or ignored by the government. If these charges have merit the prospective use of right-wing death squads in South Africa is likely to increase.

The crackdowns in South Africa appear to be of two types: collective punishments which are indiscriminate attacks on people irrespective of their acts and behaviors, and more direct repression which is focused on any community leaders who express anti-apartheid positions. The regime directs its security forces against anyone who opposes apartheid. Thus, it defines the system boundaries as any active criticism of apartheid whether from the left, liberal or moderate sector. This contradicts the regime's claim to be fighting a war against communist subversion.

The use of repression and state-terror has increased the determination of young people to oppose the apartheid establishment. Police and SADF violent actions have greatly contributed to the recruitment of anti-apartheid forces.³⁴ During the partial State of Emergency declared in 1985 (July, 1985-March, 1986), 8,000 people were detained.

Of the 30,000 people detained since the June, 1986, State of Emergency, 10,000 were under 18 years of age. Once a person is arrested, it is likely they will experience torture. In 1987, the International Commission of Jurists charged South

³⁴ Davis, op. cit., p. 28.

Africa with "widespread use of torture and violence even against children as part of a repressive strategy." The report specifically deplors the use of torture against detainees and children, the routine use of excessive force at marches, demonstrations and protests, and the encouragement of vigilante groups.³⁵

Evidence indicates the frequently offensive nature of SADF and police operations. On 27 April 1987, and without warning, the police charged an unsuspecting group of University of Cape Town students while they were sitting on the campus lawn. Police used whips and made mass arrests.

In June, 1980, "colored" students protested in the Western Cape to commemorate the 1976 Sharpeville uprisings as well as the inferior apartheid educational system. Camouflaged police were armed and ordered by the Police Commissioner to "shoot to kill."³⁶ Later, the Minister of Police apologized for, as he put it, "an unfortunate choice of words."³⁷ Sixty people were shot dead during one week in June, 1980.

The use of detention without trial is considered by some to be the most effective form of repression in South Africa. Anyone active in union, church, or student organizations

³⁵ Africa Research Bulletin, May 15, 1987. p. 8891.

³⁶ Julie Frederikse, South Africa: A Different Kind of War: From Soweto to Pretoria (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987) pp. 18-19.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

opposed to apartheid knows he/she can be picked up anytime without charges or a warrant and held indefinitely and incommunicado. Detentions are frequently used simply to remove a person from society for a given time.³⁸

A white South African doctor who moved to South Africa from Kenya in 1964 because he thought life under a black government would be intolerable was found hanged in his cell after his arrest by the South African security forces for union activities. His wife, once a supporter of apartheid, now says:

I consider myself a very loyal South African and I still think I am, but I think the security police are exactly the same as the Gestapo were. They are doing in this country what the Gestapo were doing in Nazi, Germany.³⁹

The use of shootings has been described as "the most chilling form of state repression" in South Africa.⁴⁰ Shootings are so freely authorized that when an entire family was accidentally gunned down in 1983 (Johannesburg) by police in unmarked cars, the Minister of Law and Order explained that no judicial inquiry should be made because the Criminal Procedures Act grants police the right to shoot and kill any suspect.⁴¹

³⁸ Ibid., p. 116.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 116.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 133.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 133.

Retired Police General Frans Stander claimed his son, a police officer, became a bank robber after the 1976 uprisings when the son confessed to killing 22 blacks: "Andre loved blacks and always got on very well with his black colleagues, but as a policeman he was forced to shoot kaffirs."⁴²

A summary of different types of state terror used in South Africa exposes the range of acts commonly committed by South African military and police forces. The following forms of state terrorism have been documented by Amnesty International, Africa Research Bulletin, Cawthra, and Frederikse:

1. Shootings of demonstrators often without provocation, indiscriminate shootings from armored vehicles of people and houses in townships.
2. Mass arrests and detention without charges or trial. Prisoners are held incommunicado.
3. Physical attacks and beatings. Use of whips (sjamboks) and canes.
4. Police and SADF sweeping raids and attacks on sealed off communities and townships.
5. Forced removal and relocations of people for apartheid, security, or "economic development" reasons. Use of bulldozers to demolish homes. Removals range from small and large groups of "squatters" to long time residents living in permanent quarters. Forced removals are part of the apartheid policy of consolidating Africans in the "homelands."
6. Torture of prisoners on a widespread basis. Use of electric shock, extraction of teeth, clubbing, use of Sjambocks, beatings, mock executions, hangings, "suicides," sensory deprivation.

⁴² Ibid., p. 133.

7. Abductions and disappearances of government opponents.
8. Torture of children and youths. Beatings of youths inside armored vehicles.

The constant patrolling of communities is also a means of inducing a psychological state of fear. Lelyveld discusses the psychological terror imposed on blacks by the gun brandishing plainclothes white security cops who patrol the townships. But the presence of security forces and their efforts to induce a forced awe through terror has become less efficacious as the nationalist struggle achieves successful operations against the security forces. More and more the regime must rely on offensive actions, not just presence.

Schlemmer discusses the demonstration effect of state violence on the South African population:

It is well known inside and outside South Africa that thousands of people over the years have been detained without trial on terms of security legislation. Furthermore, the occurrences of deaths in detention are well published and quite understandably create a climate of fear among would-be political activists.⁴³

The acts of state terror described above provide substantial evidence that the South African state employs state terror as a means of instilling fear in the black population.

⁴³ Lawrence Schlemmer, "Build-up to Revolution or Impasse?" South Africa: The Limits of Reform Politics, edited by Heribert Adam, (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1983) p. 75.

Summary of Case Study Findings for South Africa

The following chart summarizes the case study findings for South Africa:

	<u>Apartheid</u>
1. The state is devoted to the security of the in-group?	Yes
2. The state acquires land resources for the exclusive use of the in-group?	Yes
3. The state governs over people who are not granted full and equal citizenship rights?	Yes

Acts of State Terror

1. Beatings/Physical Attacks.	Yes
2. Shootings to injure or kill.	Yes
3. The offensive use of gas.	Unsure
4. Denial of medical care for the wounded.	Unsure
5. Sweeping raids.	Yes
6. Detention without limit or trial.	Yes
7. Prison conditions/torture.	Yes
8. Kidnappings and abductions.	Yes
9. Vigilante violence.	Yes
10. Demolition of houses as a collective punishment.	Unsure

- | | | |
|-----|---|-----|
| 11. | Collective punishments
such as curfews. | Yes |
| 12. | Deportations, forced
removals or transfers
of people. | Yes |

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

This case study analysis of political Zionism and Apartheid evaluated each ideology on the basis of whether it satisfied the requirements to be properly classified as an exclusivist ideology. The three requirements of (1) the state's devotion to the security of the in-group; (2) the state's acquisition of land and resources for the exclusive use of the in-group; and (3) the state's governance over people not granted full and equal citizenship rights, were fulfilled by political Zionism and Apartheid. The two countries were tested for their use of state terrorism against the out-group. Both countries have implemented and enforced policies of repressive martial rule over the out-group. Israel and South Africa were found to commit acts of state terror against the out-group, the Palestinians and Africans respectively.

Under an exclusivist ideology wherein the state is committed to the security of one national, ethnic, racial or religious group, it is logical (within that paradigm) that such ideologies facilitate extreme violent state acts against those who reject an asymmetrical political structure. An exclusivist ideological stance defines an in-group and an out-group and structures a relationship in which one group is supreme and one is subordinate. When such ideologically derived structures are translated into repressive practical

policies such as martial law, or state of emergency rule, it is no wonder that those who bear the impact of such policies take efforts to resist. In fact, evidence indicates that the catalyst for changing a resistor into a more determined fighter is the resistor's victimization by state terror. The horrific treatment an arrestee receives in prison is likely to increase not decrease the individual's militancy.

This thesis has shown the offensive nature of state terrorism whereby the forces of the state initiate operations with the intention of instilling an atmosphere of fear such that the populace resigns itself to the status quo. At the same time, the security forces sometimes initiate offensive operations designed to provoke, and thus draw, so-called militants out into the open as a means of creating the circumstances whereby they can be eliminated or arrested. The researcher of state terrorism is in a difficult position simply due to the fact that governments in general take precautions to hide their violent acts. The media coverage of Israeli soldiers clubbing Palestinian youths lasted only for a few months before censorship was imposed. Strict censorship has always made it difficult to monitor South African government violence. South Africa's remoteness may also partially explain why it is difficult to obtain indepth human rights information of the kind that exists on the Palestinian condition. An additional factor is, no doubt,

that of education and the Palestinian awareness of the importance of carefully recording violent state actions.

Specific types of policies and acts of state terror appear to be similar in both cases. The policy response in both cases is some form of counterinsurgency-martial law; more specifically, the Israeli government's Iron Fist policy or the South African government's State of Emergency and Total Strategy policies. The acts themselves are not so different in each case. Shooting is the most common of the deadly or severely injurious acts. Beating or physical attack on the person with a club is apparently more prevalent in the Occupied Territories than in South Africa. The use of gas is evidently another difference in the two cases. According to available evidence, it seems the Israelis have used gas more extensively in close quarters by shooting it directly into homes. The issue herein is not so much exactly which state uses more or less of certain types of state terror, but rather the documentation of actual use. On this account, it is clearly evident that both states do use state terrorism.

After researching the question of exclusivist ideology and state terror in the Israeli Occupied Territories and in South Africa, it is evident that with such ideologies as political Zionism and apartheid in force, there is little in the way of positive prospects for the future. The alternatives under Revisionist Zionism are limited. The following are possibilities:

1. Maintenance of the status quo i.e. Israeli military occupation of the Occupied Territories, the continuation of state terror.

2. Continued Israeli military presence with further attempts to "Ottomanize" the area by holding limited "autonomy" elections and talks. State terror would be used against those individuals, spokesmen and candidates not specifically approved by Israel, which could be the overwhelming majority of the population.

3. Expulsion or transfer of large numbers of Palestinians either within a short time period or in a long, drawn-out process. State terror on an extremely wide scale would be required.

As long as Revisionist Zionism continues to guide the thinking of Israeli policy makers, there is no chance of a two state solution. Acceptance of a two state solution would mean the end of Revisionist Zionism. It would also entail the severe modification of general Zionist thought towards the acceptance of a smaller Israeli state, one much less in size than the Eretz Israel called for in mainstream political Zionism. Neither Likud nor Labor accepts a two state solution to the conflict.

It is difficult to predict the course of events in regard to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. One thing is certain-- Israel wants the West Bank and Gaza territories, but does not want or need the Palestinian population. This places the Palestinians in a frightfully vulnerable position. Political Zionism structures the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the context of a zero-sum game. It is unlikely that the Israeli opposition is strong enough to exert enough pressure to alter the values of the Israeli state and populace. However, the

Palestinian Intifadah has become a world famous example of resistance. The Intifadah has been very successful in mobilizing the Palestinian community against the occupation. Resistance of this kind may be able to alter ideological values, policies and acts of state terrorism. Much of this depends on how dogmatic and capable the political Zionists are.

As for South Africa, there is no hope for a negotiated settlement as long as the Apartheid regime exists. Apartheid and the Bantustan policy would clearly have to go before any solution could be found. The alternatives under the present realities are seen as follows:

1. Maintenance of the status quo i.e. Apartheid through martial law, state of emergency rule and state terrorism.

2. Maintenance of the status quo with superficial changes in Apartheid which would subject Africans to less public racism and segregation. State terrorism would continue to be used against those not satisfied with slight modifications in Apartheid.

The resistance to apartheid is supported and shared by some white South Africans, the South African Indian community, and the international community. Despite the level of opposition, the South African regime stands firmly behind the basic principles of apartheid. The counterinsurgency "experts" in the South African government think they can solve their problem through the sophisticated use of force and co-optation. Co-optation is successful to some degree as is evident by the number of black police and soldiers serving

under white command. However, in the long term, more intense violence is in the offing. By clinging to apartheid, the South African regime severely limits any solution which would be non-, or at least less, violent. Apartheid is a violent and degrading ideology which establishes a zero-sum game between white apartheid supporters and Africans. There is reason to think a white minority could live in a democratic South Africa. Zimbabwe, Kenya, Angola and Mozambique all have minority white communities. However, if white South Africans want a strictly white country, they may eventually have to withdraw into the Cape Province. The apartheid regime is not likely to have the repressive resources needed to maintain control over the whole of South Africa. Before that happens, there will be a protracted and violent conflict in South Africa.

As long as the present ideological outlooks in Israel and South Africa remain as they are, there will be a continuation of state terror. Within each ideology, there is the explicit right of only one group (the in-group to use Adorno's term) to express national self-determination and statehood. Such an asymmetrical structuring of relations is likely to spell conflict anywhere it is found.

Bibliography

- Adam, Heribert, ed. South Africa: The Limits of Reform Politics (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983).
- Adam, Heribert. Modernizing Racial Discrimination: South Africa's Political Dynamics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).
- Adorno, Theodor W., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).
- Allon, Yigal. Shield of David: The Story of Israel's Armed Forces (New York: Random House, 1970).
- Allon, Yigal. The Making of Israel's Army (New York: Universe Books, 1970).
- Amnesty International. South Africa Briefing (Amnesty International Publications, 1986).
- Amnesty International. South Africa Briefing: New Developments (Amnesty International Publications, 1986).
- Amnesty International. South Africa's Imprisonment and Ill-Treatment of Children and Young People (New York: Amnesty Publications, 1986).
- Arendt, Hannah. The Jew as Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in the Modern Age (New York: Grove Press, 1978).
- Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966).
- Aron, Raymond. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
- Aronson, Geoffrey. Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians and the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987).
- Aruri, Naseer, ed. The Palestinian Resistance to Israeli Occupation (Wilmete, IL: The Medina University Press International, 1970).
- Aruri, Naseer M., ed. Occupation: Israel Over Palestine (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1983).

- Aulas, Marie-Christine. "The Sovereign State and the Institutionalization of Lawlessness: The Palestinians, Israel, and the Arab World." Unpublished paper given at AAUG meeting, San Francisco, November 10-13, 1988.
- Averbach, Yehudit and Hemda Ben Yehuda. "Attitudes Toward an Existence Conflict: Begin and Dayan on the Palestinian Issue." International Interactions (Vol. 13, No. 4, 1987).
- Avnery, Uri. My Friend, the Enemy (London: Zed Books, 1986).
- Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin. The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).
- Ben Meir, Yehuda. National Security Decision-Making: The Israeli Case (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).
- Benvenisti, Meron. The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984).
- Benvenisti, Meron. The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).
- Benziman, Uzi. Sharon: An Israeli Caesar (New York: ADAMA Books, 1985).
- Berger, Elmer. Who Knows Better Must Say So! (Beirut: The Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970).
- Blumenfeld, Jesmond, ed. South Africa in Crisis (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
- Buntin, Brian. The Rise of the South African Reich (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1964).
- Cainkar, Louise. Data Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights. House Demolitions and Sealings (Chicago Office: 1 Quincy Court, Suite, 1980).
- Cawthra, Gavin. Brutal Force: The Apartheid Way Machine (London: International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1986).
- Chomsky, Noam. Pirates and Emperors (New York: Claremont Research and Publications, 1986).
- Chomsky, Noam. The Chomsky Reader (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).

- Chomsky, Noam. Towards a New Cold War (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982).
- Claude, Richard P., ed. Comparative Human Rights (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).
- Coker, Christopher. South Africa's Security Dilemmas (New York: Praeger, 1987).
- Davis, Stephen M. Apartheid Rebels: Inside South Africa's Hidden War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).
- Davis, Uri. Israel: An Apartheid State (London: Zed Books, 1987).
- Dominguez, Jorge, et al., eds. Enhancing Global Human Rights (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979).
- Donnelly, Jack and Rhoda E. Howard, eds. International Handbook of Human Rights (New York: Greenwood, 1987).
- EAFORD and AJAZ. Judaism or Zionism: What Difference for the Middle East? (London: Zed Books, 1986).
- Ebenstein, William. Today's Isms (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1954).
- Elazar, Daniel, ed. Governing Peoples and Territories (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1982).
- Elizur, Yuval and Eliahu Salpeter. Who Rules Israel? (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).
- Fabian, Larry and Ze'ev Schiff. Israelis Speak (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1977).
- Falk, Richard. Human Rights and State Sovereignty (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1981).
- Flapan, Simha. The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987).
- Flapan, Simha. Zionism and the Palestinians (London: Croom Helm, 1979).
- Foster, Don. Detention and Torture in South Africa: Psychological, Legal and Historical Studies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).
- Frankel, Philip, et al., eds. State Resistance and Change in South Africa (London: Croom Helm, 1988).

- Frederikse, Julie. South Africa: A Different Kind of War from Soweto to Pretoria (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).
- Garaudy, Roger. The Case of Israel: A Study of Political Zionism (London: Shorouk, 1983).
- Green, Stephen. Living by the Sword: Americans and Israel in the Middle East 1968-87 (Brattleboro, VT: AMANA Books, 1988).
- Grundy, Kenneth W. The Militarization of South African Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986).
- Handel, Michael. Israel's Political-Military Doctrine (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1973).
- Haysom, Nicholas. Apartheid's Private Army: The Rise of Right-Wing Vigilantes in South Africa (Johannesburg: Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witwatersrand, 1986).
- Heller, Mark. A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983).
- Hunter, Jane. Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America (Boston: South End Press, 1987).
- Huntington, Samuel and Clement H. Moore, eds. Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
- International Defense and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. Apartheid: The Facts (Orpington: Bishop and Sons, 1983).
- International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Zionism and Racism (IDEAFORD, Conference, Tripoli, 1977).
- Jansen, Michael. Dissonance in Zion (London: Zed Books, 1987).
- Jansen, Michael. The Battle of Beirut: Why Israel Invaded Lebanon (Boston: South End Press, 1982).
- Jiryis, Sabri. The Arabs in Israel (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
- Joseph, Benjamin. Besieged Bedfellows: Israel and the Land of Apartheid (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988).

- Kahane, Meir. They Must Go (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1981).
- Khalidi, Walid, ed. From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948 (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987).
- Kren, George M. and Leon Rappoport. The Holocaust and the Crisis of Human Behavior (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980).
- Kurtzer, Daniel Charles. Palestine Guerrillas and Israeli Counterinsurgency Warfare: The Radicalization of the Palestine Arab Community to Violence. Ph.D. Dissertation. (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1976).
- Lambley, Peter. The Psychology of Apartheid (London: Secker and Warburg, 1980).
- Lanir, Zvi, ed. Israeli Security Planning in the 1980's (New York: Praeger, 1984).
- Laqueur, Walter. Terrorism: A Study of National and International Political Violence (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1977).
- Larsen, S. U., et al., ed. Who Were the Fascists: Social Roots of European Fascism (Bergen: Universitets forlaget, 1980).
- Legum, Colin. Vorster's Gamble for Africa: How the Search for Peace Failed (London: Rex Collings, 1976).
- Lelyveld, Joseph. Move Your Shadow (New York: Viking Penguin Books, 1985).
- Leonard, Richard. South Africa at War (Westport: Lawrence Hill, 1983).
- Lissak, Moshe, ed. Israeli Society and Its Defense Establishment: The Social and Political Impact of a Protracted Violent Conflict (London: Franke Cass, 1984).
- Magubane, Bernard. The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979).
- Moffett, George. "Do Israeli Officers Order Beatings?" The Christian Science Monitor, Wednesday, February 15, 1989.

- Moleah, Alfred T. "South Africa Under Siege: The Ever-deepening Crisis of Apartheid." Without Prejudice Vol. 1, No. 1 (Fall, 1987).
- Newman, David, ed. The Impact of Gush Emunim Politics and Settlement in the West Bank (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
- Omond, Roger. The Apartheid Handbook (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986).
- Osia, Kunirum. Israel, South Africa and Black Africa (New York: Lanham, 1981).
- Platzky, Lavrine, et al. The Surplus People Forced Removals in South Africa (Johannesburg: Raven Press, 1985).
- Rader, Melvin. Marx's Interpretation of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).
- Robertson, Ian, ed. Race and Politics in South Africa (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978).
- Rolbant, Samuel. The Israeli Soldier: Profile of an Army (New Jersey: Thomas Yoseloff Ltd., 1970).
- Said, Edward W. and Christopher Hitchens, eds. Blaming the Victims (London: Verso, 1988).
- Saul, John S. and Stephen Gelb. The Crisis in South Africa: Class Defense, Class Revolution (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981).
- Saul, John S. The Crisis in South Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986).
- Schlagheck, Donna M. International Terrorism (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988).
- Schmid, Alex. Political Terrorism: A Research Guide to Concepts, Theories, Data Bases and Literature (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1984).
- Schnall, David J. Beyond the Green Line (New York: Praeger, 1984).
- Segev, Tom. 1949: The First Israelis (New York: The Free Press, 1986).
- Sella, Amon and Yael Yishai. Israel the Peaceful Belligerent, 1967-79 (London: MacMillan Press, 1986).

- Shahak, Israel. "Israeli Apartheid and the Intifada." Race and Class, Vol. 30, No. 1 (1988).
- Shalev, Aryeh. The West Bank: Line of Defense (New York: Praeger, 1985).
- Sharabi, Hisham, ed. The Next Arab Decade: Alternative Futures (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988).
- Shavit, Yaacov. "Ideology, World View, and National Policy: The Case of the Likud Government 1977-1984." The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1987).
- Shepherd, George W. and Ved P. Nanda. Human Rights and Third World Development (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985).
- Stohl, Michael and George A. Lopez, eds. Government Violence and Repression (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).
- Stohl, Michael and George A. Lopez, eds. The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression (Westport: Greenwood, 1984).
- Thackrah, John R. Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).
- Thompson, Leonard. The Political Mythology of Apartheid (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
- Uhlig, Mark, ed. Apartheid in Crisis (New York: Vintage Books, 1986).
- United States State Department. Human Rights Report 1988. (Washington, D.C., 1988).

Periodicals

AL-FAJR

In These Times

Journal of Palestine Studies (Washington, D.C., Institute
for Palestine Studies)

Middle East Monitor (AAUG)

Middle East Report (MERIP)

Monthly Review

New Outlook: Middle East Monthly

Palestine Focus

Palestine Perspectives

South Scan

The Christian Science Monitor

The Jerusalem Post (International Edition)

The Link

The Los Angeles Times

The New York Times

The San Diego Union

The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs

The Weekly Mail

IDEOLOGY, STATE SECURITY, AND STATE
TERRORISM: A COMPARATIVE STUDY

by

Daniel G. Acheson-Brown

B.A. Washburn University, 1981

B.S. Kansas State University, 1986

AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS
submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY
Manhattan, Kansas

1989

Ideology, State Security, and State Terrorism: A Comparative Study is a thesis which informally tests the following hypothesis: Ideologies which specify one particular group as having the exclusive and, therefore, asymmetrical right to the governance of a state, facilitate the use of state terrorism against people defined as an out-group. A proper test of this hypothesis is not possible within the limits of a Master's Thesis, so two countries have been selected for case study analysis: Israel in the Occupied Territories and South Africa. While a two-country case study is not sufficient to confirm or disconfirm this hypothesis the study has value as an informal test.

The thesis tests for an exclusivist ideology and the use of state terrorism. State policies of martial law and state of emergency rule are examined to see if they translate ideological perspectives into practical action. An exclusivist ideology was operationally defined as was state terrorism. The criteria for both variables were then applied to the two selected states.

This thesis found that both states have an exclusivist-ideology and practice state terrorism. Both states also have policies of martial law and state of emergency rule. The state terror in both countries is often offensive, and initiated against people who have not been proven to have committed any threatening acts.

The concluding chapter assesses the possible alternatives under the respective ideological paradigms to see what potentialities may take place in the future.

The findings of this thesis indicate that under the tenets of Apartheid and political Zionism, there is little prospect for an end to state terror.